Papers, Please!

We’ve been having a hard time keeping up with events over the last few weeks. Every time we think the keystone cops from the Department of Homeland Security can’t come up with anything dumber to do, they prove us wrong. At this point we’re not sure who is most deserving of derision: (1) the would-be terrorist who tried but failed to explode his underpants, and succeeded only in burning his balls, (2) the goons the TSA sent to intimidate bloggers who tried to tell travelers what to expect when they got to the airport, and find out who had “leaked” the TSA’s secrets, but who left their own notebook of “secret” notes about their investigation of this and other cases behind in a public place, or (3) the TSA agents who felt so ill at the smell of honey they found in checked luggage that they checked themselves into a hospital and shut down the airport. It’s a tough call. Leave your votes, or other nominations, in the comments.

What’s most striking about the government’s response to this unsuccessful bombing attempt is the complete lack of any rational relationship between the actions that have been taken and are being proposed, any analysis of which of these and similar tactics did or did not contribute to the success or failure of the Christmas Day attack on Northwest Airlines flight 253, and any likelihood that they would make future attempts at terrorism less likely to succeed.

Now that the dust has settled a bit, perhaps it’s time to survey the security, security theater, surveillance, and travel control techniques at issue: (more…)

WSAV-TV has a Thanksgiving travel-season report on what they found when they used our forms and instructions to request their travel records from the DHS “Automated Targeting System”, including examples of what sorts of information are included in these records and extensive supplmentary material on their website including a 20-minute interview with Identity Project consultant Edward Hasbrouck.

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security has scheduled a hearing on Tuesday, November 10th, at 10 a.m. in Washington to consider the nomination of Erroll G. Southers to be Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration.

None of the questions we think are important got asked during an earlier confirmation hearing before the Senate Commerce and Transportation Committee.  If you want the nominee for TSA to have to tell us, before he is confirmed, whether or not he thinks we have a right to travel, whether TSA decisions should be subject to judicial review, and whether he thinks the government should be keeping logs of the movements of innocent people, let your Senators and the members of the Homeland Security Committee know about your concerns, before November 10th.

We’ve asked for expedited processing of our FOIA request for the TSA’s “Standard Operating Procedures” at checkpoints, in order to make it possible to ask the nominee about those procedures and which of them he would change.

The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has released a redacted version of a report (OIG-09-103) that was provided to Congress in August, evaluating the TSA’s “Traveler Redress Inquiry Program” (TRIP). The TRIP name may be corny, but it’s also oddly accurate: it’s a system for inquiries, not answers, and as the OIG concludes it advertises more than it delivers and and often doesn’t result in real redress.

We commend Rep. Bennie Thompson, Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, for requesting this report. It’s worth reading for giving one of the most detailed public descriptions to date as to the actual process by which a constellation of Federal agencies decide what entries to put on (and off) their “watch lists”, and who to allow to fly.

The OIG doesn’t consider the statutory, Constitutional, and international treaty-law right to travel, referring at one point to “the privilege of boarding an aircraft” (p. 68). But even within this perspective of travel as a privilege, not a right, the OIG concludes that the current redress and review procedure “is not fair” (p. 59):

This approach provides no guarantee that an impartial review of the redress complaint will occur. Instead, it ensures that the offices that initially acted on the TECS lookout and were the source of the redress-seeker’s travel difficulties will also be the final arbiters of whether the basis for the traveler’s secondary inspection is overridden…

DHS is required to offer aggrieved travelers a “fair” redress process. Impartial and objective review and adjudication of redress petitions is an essential part of any fair redress process. A process that relies exclusively on the review and consideration of redress claims by the office that was the source of the traveler’s grievance is not fair. CBP should modify its redress process in this area to provide for independent review.

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The Identity Project has joined with more than two dozen other organizations and individual experts from the Privacy Coalition in a joint letter to the House Committee on Homland Security, criticizing the DHS Privacy Office and its annual report and calling for better Congressional oversight of privacy-invasive DHS practices and the DHS Privacy Office itself.

There’s more about the letter, and the DHS response, today in the Washington Post.

We’re pleased to be part of this joint effort, and we hope Congress does more to rein in the DHS — although of course we are disappointed that DHS noncompliance with the law, the Constitution, and international treaties has made such a campaign necessary.  The DHS consistently tries to exempt itself from major requirements of the Privacy Act, such as:

• Obtaining personal information from the person affected, rather than from third parties.
• Making personal information accessible to the person affected.
• Giving people a serious opportunity to correct records about them at DHS (or collected and held by “private” entities at DHS behest and used by the DHS).
• Only collecting information that is relevant to lawful purposes.
• Only collecting information that is timely.
• Only collecting information that is accurate.
• Only collecting information about categories of individuals disclosed in formal “System of Records Notices” in the Federal Register.
• Not collecting information about the First Amendment protected activities of US persons — such as who they are associating with, the books they are carrying or reading, the art or slogans or expressive insignia on their clothing or possessions, or where, why, how, and with whom they are assembling.

DHS claims for itself the ability to “exempt” itself from these statutory requirements. They do not cite any statute or court case that allows them to do so.

The DHS Privacy Office has been intimately involved in producing Federal Register filings that claim these exemptions from fundamental statutory Federal record-keeping requirements, and fail to properly disclose the extent of DHS systems of travel records. DHS travel records include information about numerous categories of people not mentioned in the SORNs, from people who pay for other people’s tickets to people whose phone numbers where entered in reservations of houseguests reconfirming flights, as well other information prohibited form collection by the Privacy Act.  In this way, the Privacy Office has actively undermined the Privacy Act that they are sworn to uphold, and has been a party to criminal violations of the Privacy Act in the continued operation of these systems of records.  We’ve gotten no response whatsoever to our repeated formal complaints of these crimes filed with the DHS Privacy Office.

From time to time, people ask us, “But why don’t you want to show ID when you travel?  What’s wrong with that?” There are probably as many answers to that question as there are people who resist government demands to show ID when they travel, even when it’s scary and involves some personal risk to say “No” to the TSA agents and their rent-a-cops.  But for one answer among many to the question, “Why?”, we asked one of those people, Joe Williams.  He responded with the following guest blog post:

Why shouldn’t we have to show ID when flying?

Because it doesn’t make us safer, it’s unconstitutional, and truly free countries don’t require it.

Long after the ID-demand policy was implemented in the summer of 1996, 9/11 proved that ID requirements don’t work. Even if you are on a no- fly list all one needs to do is: Buy a ticket in some innocent person’s name. Check in online and print that person’s boarding pass. Save that web page as a PDF and use Adobe Acrobat to change the name on the boarding pass to your own. Print it again. At the airport, use the fake boarding pass and your valid ID to get through security. At the gate use the real boarding pass to board your flight.

Being required to show ID only proves the success of al-Qaeda with fear established and freedoms violated.

Most people are not aware that freedoms in the Constitution are “inalienable & natural” meaning we were born with them. They are not government granted. Just as the U.S. Constitution represents our inalienable right to life, liberty, & freedom, so too does the TSA represent a significant threat to those God-given rights. TSA protocol is to assume all innocent people to be a threat until being cleared from a secret list. Put another way, “The innocent shall suffer the sins of the guilty.”

Previous court decisions are referenced in justifying the legalization of ID requirements which translates into; it’s OK to violate a little of the people’s freedom, just not a lot. Most people are not willing to be inconvenienced to challenge these requirements, let alone initiate a real legal battle or protest. It’s easier to show ID than to fight for one’s rights and freedom.

And when legal challenges have been made against these secret “security directives”, courts have ruled they are secret laws and barred from public scrutiny or debate. Checkpoints & ID requirements are more commonly associated with governments who suppress freedom yet we implement them in the name of safety and security. In the name of national security, government can violate peoples’ freedom. Being forced to announce one’s self is a loss of privacy and “taking away a person’s privacy renders to the government the ability to control absolutely that person.” (Ayn Rand)

“In the end, the photo ID requirement is based on the myth that we can somehow correlate identity with intent. We can’t.” (Bruce Schneier, Chief Security Technology officer of BT Global Services) Surveillance is not freedom. Having to ask for permission is not freedom. Most elected officials believe the more legislation passed exerting more government control over people, the better off society is. The Constitution was written to restrict government yet most elected officials look for ways to circumvent instead of defending the Constitution as stated in their oath of office. It is not an elected official’s job to give freedom. It’s their job to defend it.

I would rather live in a higher risk society wrapped in freedom than live as a slave in complete safety & security.

Joe Williams
concerned citizen
Atlanta, GA

“Domestic travel restrictions are the hallmark of authoritarian states, not free nations.” (Congressman Ron Paul)

“Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war — the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe they, at length, become willing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions alluded to are STANDING ARMIES, and the correspondent appendages of military establishments.” (Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 8, November 20, 1787)

“We uphold Freedom by exercising it – not by restricting it.” (The Identity Project)

President Obama’s much-belated nominee to head the Transportation Security Administration, Erroll Southers — faced only softball questioning at a confirmation hearing last week before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  None of the questions we’ve raised for the nominee about TSA policies and procedures, or about the philosophical or practical attitude of the nominee toward the right to travel, were asked by any of the Senators. Nor, despite the nominee’s background of as a policeman (L.A. airport police commander and former FBI agent), was there any exploration of the role of the TSA as the Federal police agency that most often interacts directly with people who are accused of no crime — literally the front lines of Federal policing of innocent citizens.

The nomination of Mr. Southers has also been referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, which plans to hold its own confirmation hearing after it receives further background information from Mr. Southers, probably in late November.

If you want to know whether the Obama Administration and its nominee plan to set a new course for the TSA, let your Senators and the members of the Homeland Security know that you want them to ask tough questions (”Do we have a right to travel? Should the obligations of travelers at TSA checkpoints be spelled out in publicly-disclosed regulations?  Should no-fly decisions be subject to judicial review? Should we have to show ID to fly? Should the government keep records of our travels?”) before they vote to approve any nominee for TSA Administrator.

Travelers are more concerned about TSA screening than airline safety, according to the results of the first poll conducted by the Consumer Travel Alliance.

“TSA screening” ranked sixth in the survey, with 44.1 percent of respondents saying it was of the highest priority among all possible travel issues (not limited to airlines). “Airline safety” was seventh, with 41.1 percent rating it among the “most important” consumer travel issues.

Congress, are you listening?

There’s been a lot of confusing (and often confused) reporting recently about the TSA’s so-called “Secure Flight” scheme for surveillance and control of passengers on domestic U.S. airline flights, based on data mining of airline reservations and lifetime travel histories.

If you’re looking for answers, you might start with our FAQ about “Secure Flight”.

Much of the confusion comes from the fact that the TSA’s orders to the airlines to implement “Secure Flight”, setting out which airlines are required to do what, and when, are all contained in secret “Security Directives”.  So we have only the TSA’s press releases — which they have previously told us would “creat[e] public confusion” were the public actually to rely on them, and which have often proven to be lies anyway — as clues to what is really being required.

We do know, however, the essence of what the “Secure Flight” regulations actually require: the shift to a permssion-based system of control of domestic air travelers (similar to the shift already being made for international air travelers under the APIS regulations, and for land border crossings under the WHTI rules), with a default of, “No”.

In addition to the questions in our original our FAQ, recent news reports raise some additional questions worth answering:

• Was the “Secure Flight” scheme “[b]orn out of recommendations from the 9/11 Commission” (NPR)? No. “Secure Flight” is the latest name for a program originally called “CAPPS-II”, which was conceived almost immediately after 9/11 and well before the 9/11 Commission was even appointed.  More importantly, “Secure Flight” is directly contrary to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that, “The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use…. [There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties."
• Is "Secure Flight" a legal "requirement" (TSA press release)? No. Not only is "Secure Flight" (a) in violation of international treaties to which the U.S. is a party (Article 12 of the ICCPR provides in part that, "Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement") and (b) the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble"), but (c) the TSA has been expressly forbidden by Federal law from implementing "Secure Flight" "on other than a test basis" unless and until the GAO has certified that 10 specific criteria have been met.  The GAO has moved the goalposts set by Congress to certify that most of those criteria have, under clearly distorted interpretations, been met -- but not yet all of them.  The assignment to each would-be passenger of a score of "cleared", "inhibited", or "not cleared" appears to violate the provision of the same law that, "None of the funds provided in this or any previous appropriations Act may be utilized to develop or test algorithms assigning risk to passengers whose names are not on government watch lists."  And "Secure Flight" also potentially violates restrictions on data mining. [Update: It appears that the TSA is interpreting the GAO's statements as constituting the necessary certification, even though the GAO said that "Additional Actions Are Needed".  According to Business Travel News, "'There's nothing more to be tested, and no more approvals we need,' said program director Paul Leyh.... 'All it is now is to start the implementation process.'"]
• Can the TSA or the airline prevent you flying or impose other sanctions as a penalty for non-compliance with “Secure Flight” requirements such as providing my date of birth, gender, etc? No. [Not unless they can successfully claim that the GAO has made the necessary certification, and that "cleared", "inhibited", or "not cleared" is not a "risk score".] The same law that prohibits the TSA from “deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis” of “Secure Flight” also provides that, “During the testing phase … no information gathered from passengers, foreign or domestic air carriers, or reservation systems may be used to screen aviation passengers, or delay or deny boarding to such passengers, except in instances where passenger names are matched to a government watch list.”

One reason there’s been no change in TSA “policy” under the Obama administration — if you can call it “policy” when there are no rules and the people in charge think their decisions aren’t subject to judicial review –  is that President Obama hasn’t yet appointed an Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Transportation Security (a/k/a “TSA Administrator”).  So the TSA is still being run by temprary caretaker holdovers, who are forging ahead with the deployment of several schemes promulgated last year by the previous administration, such as Secure Flight, which would transform domestic air travel into a permission-based surveillance and control system with a default of “No”, and the international APIS and WHTI rules for international travel.

Now there are beginning to be rumors of who Obama may appoint.  We haven’t yet seen any discussion of what (if any) policies the rumored nominee might favor, but perhaps it’s time to remind Senators of the questions for such nominees that we put forward last year, after the elections, as part of our Proposed Agenda on the Right to Travel (PDF) for the Obama Administration and Congress:

Questions for nominees for the DHS and TSA:

“As the nominee for Secretary of Homeland Security or Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, …

1. Do you believe that individuals should have a right to travel in the USA? Why or why not?
2. What substantive (e.g probable cause) and procedural (e.g. due process and judicial review) standards do you believe should apply to actions by or directed by your agency, or other government agencies, that would restrict that right?
3. Should individuals in the USA be required to have or display government ID in order to travel by common carrier or on public rights-of-way by plane? By train? By bus? By ship or ferry? By private car? On foot? Why or why not?
4. Should individuals in the USA be required to obtain government permission in order to travel by common carrier or on public rights-of-way by plane? By train? By bus? By ship or ferry? By private car? On foot? Why or why not?
5. Should US citizens be required to have a passport and/or obtain government permission in order to leave the USA? Why or why not?
6. Should US citizens be required to have a passport and/or obtain government permission in order to return to the USA from abroad? Why or why not?
7. Should the government maintain records of the travel or movement of people who are not suspected of a crime or subject to a court order authorizing surveillance and logging of their movements? Why or why not?
8. Should the government mandate the collection or maintenance by travel companies of records of the travel or movement of people who are not suspected of a crime or subject to a court order authorizing surveillance and logging of their movements? Why or why not?
9. Should travel companies or other third parties to whom individuals are required by the government to provide personal information be free to use, sell, or “share” that information, or should it be protected by laws? Why or why not?
10. What do you think should be done with existing government files of travel records about innocent people?

The Senate should also ask whether a TSA nominee is willing to commit the agency to the rule of law, by promising to enforce only those sanctions against travelers prescribed by publicly-promulgated rules, and by ensuring that all TSA snactions against travelers (including , of ocurse, “no-fly” orders), are subject to judicial review.

If you agree that these are the key issues for the TSA, let your Senators and the members of the Committee on Homeland Security know that you want these questions asked and answered before any new head of the TSA is confirmed.