“Can SFO rein in the feds?”
As discussed in a feature article today by Clara-Sophia Daly on Mission Local, recent searches and arrests of passengers trying to board domestic flights at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) have prompted us to question what the airport has done, and what more it could and should do, to comply with city ordinances regulating use of surveillance technology and restricting collaboration with immigration enforcement.
The arrest of Iryna Gorb by ICE at SFO on July 22nd and the search of Nikolas De Bremaeker by the TSA (and/or by Covenant Aviation Security, the contractor that supplies most of the checkpoint staff at SFO) at SFO on June 10th, raise questions about (1) the technologies in use to flag passengers to components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on airline reservations, (2) whether equipment owned or operated by the airport is used to collect data passed on the DHS, (3) what if any limits are placed on warrantless access by DHS agents to airport premises, and (4) whether the policies of the airport, as put in place by the SF Airport Commission as an agency of the City and County, comply with city ordinances.
For both domestic and international flights, the DHS requires airlines to send information about all passengers and their itineraries to DHS components starting 72 hours before departure. Reservation and itinerary information for international flights is sent to US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and included in its Automated Targeting System (ATS). Information for domestic flights is sent to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) through its Secure Flight system.
No airline is allowed to issue a boarding pass for either a domestic or international flight unless and until it receives an individualized, per-passenger, per-flight permission message from the TSA or CBP in the form of a “boarding pass printing result” (BPPR). The default in the absence of a favorable BPPR is not to allow them to fly. These fly/no-fly decisions are based on a black box of secret algorithms that incorporate list-based rules (blocklists) and other rules based on other known and unknown data.
Once such a data collection and algorithmic control mechanism is in place, it’s easy to add lists or other rules to the algorithm or add recipients to the data stream.
What’s less well known is that the DHS doesn’t just use the information it gets from airlines to decide whether or not to allow you to fly. It can also use this information to generate “handling codes” instructing checkpoint staff to conduct special searches of your person and property, or to generate messages to other agencies that may want to arrange an “unwelcoming” party to intercept you at the airport, on departure or on arrival, to question, search, or arrest you – with or without a warrant.
We question the legality of many of these activities. Many of them have not yet been reviewed or approved by any court, and have little or no basis in law.
Airline passengers need to know that, legal or not, this is happening.
Travelers also need to know that, as we were the first to report last year (see here and here) and as was later confirmed by the New York Times, some of the most intrusive and legally questionable aspects of these systems of surveillance and control of air travel, based on reservation data from airlines, have in the last year been expanded from international flights to domestic flights. Air travelers should beware.

