Nov 17 2009

Traveler arrested at Albuquerque TSA checkpoint

A traveler attempting to return home from a political conference (a gathering clearly protected by the First Amendment right to assemble) was arrested at a TSA checkpoint at the airport in Albuquerque, New Mexico on Sunday after he (1) politely declined to show tangible evidence of his identity and (2) began recording audio, video, and/or still photographs of the incident with a handheld device. The traveler, Phil Mocek, has been a regular participant in discussions of ID requirements and TSA procedures on Flyertalk.com, and has been mentioned here before for his efforts to uncover what the “rules” if any) are at TSA checkpoints. According to initial reports and discussion elsewhere, he was released Monday, after a night in jail, and charged with criminal trespass (Albuquerque Code of Ordinances § 12-2-3), resisting, obstructing or refusing to obey a lawful order of an officer (§ 12-2-19), concealing identity with intent to obstruct, intimidate, hinder or interrupt (§ 12-2-16), and disorderly conduct (NMSA § 30-2-1). [Note: It appears that direct links to sections of the Albuquerque Code of Ordinances will work only after you click on the Albuquerque Code of Ordinances link and then on either “frames” or “no frames”, to set the required cookies in your Web browser.]

As of now, it’s unclear whether the arrest was primarily in retaliation for Mr Mocek’s declining to proffer evidence of his identity or his recording of audio, video, and/or still photographs.  It’s also unclear whether he was arrested by, or at the behest of, Feds or local or state law enforcement officers (or TSA contractor rent-a-cops?), an issue that has figured prominently and sometimes decisively in other ID-demand and checkpoint cases.

We wish Mr. Mocek success in defending against these bogus charges and obtain obtaining redress from those responsible. We’ll have more to say as soon as we have a chance to see the actual complaint.

(We’ve been in touch with Mr. Mocek. As of now, he can’t comment on what happened, on the advice of counsel.  But if you’d like to help him fight back, you can contribute to his legal defense fund.)

[UPDATE: The trial which was scheduled to begin June 14, 2010 has been postponed. Check  our FAQ about the case or the court calendar for further updates as soon as they are available. For the status of the case, go to the county court website, complete the “captcha”, and enter “2573709” in the “criminal case number” field.  Documents obtained by Mr. Mocek in response to his requests under New Mexico’s public records laws, including police reports and audio recordings, have been posted here.  For further updates, see the ongoing discussion in the travel “security” forum at Flyertalk.com. Mr. Mocek is represented by private defense counsel, at considerable personal expense. You can help by making a donation to his defense fund.]

Nov 10 2009

TSA releases excerpts from guidelines for searches

As part of an effort to derail the lawsuit brought by the ACLU on behalf of Steve Bierfeldt — who was detained and interrogated at a TSA checkpoint at the St. Louis airport because he was (a) carrying an (entirely legal) amount of cash that the TSA agents apparently didn’t like, although they admitted that there was any suspicion that he had violated any TSA regulation or posed an threat to aviation, and (b) declined to answer questions about his money unless the TSA told him, which they persistently declined to do, whether he was legally required ot answer their questions — the TSA has filed a public declaration with the court that includes their latest “Management Directive” on searches of travelers.

The directive is the first official TSA document to be made public concerning the limits (if any) and authority (if any) for TSA searches of travelers. It’s part of the information the Identity Project is currently attempting to obtain through a pending request under the  Freedom of Information Act for the TSA’s “Screening Management Standard Operating Procedures” (SOP) as well as “any and all … interpretive or guidance notes, usage instructions, or the like”, such as the Management Directive included in the TSA’s court declaration.  Under FOIA, the TSA’s response to our request is due by this Friday, November 13th, unless they ask for a 10-day extension for special reasons, and we are eager to see the rest of the SOP and the directives interpreting and implementing it.

The “Management Directive” in the declaration filed with the court by the TSA only concerns searches.  It does cover  searches for evidence of identiy, although to avoid categorizing them as “searches” it describes them as “screening for identification media”.  But it’s completely silent regarding interrogations, Miranda warnings, or your right to remain silent.  So it looks like neither Steve Bierfeldt nor the public will get an answer, at least for now, to the question he kept asking the TSA agents who detained and interrogated him: “Am I legally required to answer that question?”

Nov 02 2009

TSA nominee up for Senate questioning November 10th

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security has scheduled a hearing on Tuesday, November 10th, at 10 a.m. in Washington to consider the nomination of Erroll G. Southers to be Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration.

None of the questions we think are important got asked during an earlier confirmation hearing before the Senate Commerce and Transportation Committee.  If you want the nominee for TSA to have to tell us, before he is confirmed, whether or not he thinks we have a right to travel, whether TSA decisions should be subject to judicial review, and whether he thinks the government should be keeping logs of the movements of innocent people, let your Senators and the members of the Homeland Security Committee know about your concerns, before November 10th.

We’ve asked for expedited processing of our FOIA request for the TSA’s “Standard Operating Procedures” at checkpoints, in order to make it possible to ask the nominee about those procedures and which of them he would change.

Nov 02 2009

“Do I have the right to refuse this search?”

We’re not the only people asking questions about what is and isn’t required of travelers at TSA checkpoints.  Here’s the latest account — by a recently-retired career police officer — of what can happen when you try to ask these questions.

The author of the article didn’t get much of an answer — which is, of course, disturbing in itself. Our FOIA request for the TSA’s complete screening manual and Standard Operating Procedures for airport checkpoints remains pending. we got excerpts earlier this year, after months of delay, but now we’ve asked for the entire document on an expedited basis.

Oct 27 2009

DHS Inspector General rips “TRIP” kangaroo courts

The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has released a redacted version of a report (OIG-09-103) that was provided to Congress in August, evaluating the TSA’s “Traveler Redress Inquiry Program” (TRIP). The TRIP name may be corny, but it’s also oddly accurate: it’s a system for inquiries, not answers, and as the OIG concludes it advertises more than it delivers and and often doesn’t result in real redress.

We commend Rep. Bennie Thompson, Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, for requesting this report. It’s worth reading for giving one of the most detailed public descriptions to date as to the actual process by which a constellation of Federal agencies decide what entries to put on (and off) their “watch lists”, and who to allow to fly.

The OIG doesn’t consider the statutory, Constitutional, and international treaty-law right to travel, referring at one point to “the privilege of boarding an aircraft” (p. 68). But even within this perspective of travel as a privilege, not a right, the OIG concludes that the current redress and review procedure “is not fair” (p. 59):

This approach provides no guarantee that an impartial review of the redress complaint will occur. Instead, it ensures that the offices that initially acted on the TECS lookout and were the source of the redress-seeker’s travel difficulties will also be the final arbiters of whether the basis for the traveler’s secondary inspection is overridden…

DHS is required to offer aggrieved travelers a “fair” redress process. Impartial and objective review and adjudication of redress petitions is an essential part of any fair redress process. A process that relies exclusively on the review and consideration of redress claims by the office that was the source of the traveler’s grievance is not fair. CBP should modify its redress process in this area to provide for independent review.

Read More

Oct 27 2009

TSA sends our FOIA request into a black hole

We learned yesterday from the U.S Postal Service that the TSA has been assigned a new zip code, 20598 (or at least so we were told on the phone by the USPS Customer Affairs department — we have no way to verify whether it’s true, or what the “correct” zip code should be), replacing the former 22202, and has instructed the USPS that they will not accept delivery of anything addressed to zip code 22202.  But the TSA still lists 22202 as the zip code for FOIA requests on their Web site, and they have yet to publish a new Federal Register notice officially designating a new FOIA request address.

Our most recent request was under FOIA.  But the same address is officially designated for TSA Privacy Act requests on the TSA website and in numerous System of Records Notices (SORNs), and we assume that Privacy Act requests have the same problems.

A FOIA request we sent (by Express Mail, with a request for expedited processing) 12 days ago has gone into a black hole: It hasn’t been returned to us as the sender, but there’s no record of it being delivered. Nor is there any written record of the TSA refusing to accept it or directing the USPS not to attempt to deliver it.

We haven’t been able to find out how long this has been going on, or how many sacks (truckloads?) of mail and how many tens or hundreds of FOIA requests may have been similarly dealt with.

Read More

Oct 27 2009

Who’s watching the watchers at the DHS “Privacy” Office?

The Identity Project has joined with more than two dozen other organizations and individual experts from the Privacy Coalition in a joint letter to the House Committee on Homland Security, criticizing the DHS Privacy Office and its annual report and calling for better Congressional oversight of privacy-invasive DHS practices and the DHS Privacy Office itself.

There’s more about the letter, and the DHS response, today in the Washington Post.

We’re pleased to be part of this joint effort, and we hope Congress does more to rein in the DHS — although of course we are disappointed that DHS noncompliance with the law, the Constitution, and international treaties has made such a campaign necessary.  The DHS consistently tries to exempt itself from major requirements of the Privacy Act, such as:

  • Obtaining personal information from the person affected, rather than from third parties.
  • Making personal information accessible to the person affected.
  • Giving people a serious opportunity to correct records about them at DHS (or collected and held by “private” entities at DHS behest and used by the DHS).
  • Only collecting information that is relevant to lawful purposes.
  • Only collecting information that is timely.
  • Only collecting information that is accurate.
  • Only collecting information about categories of individuals disclosed in formal “System of Records Notices” in the Federal Register.
  • Not collecting information about the First Amendment protected activities of US persons — such as who they are associating with, the books they are carrying or reading, the art or slogans or expressive insignia on their clothing or possessions, or where, why, how, and with whom they are assembling.

DHS claims for itself the ability to “exempt” itself from these statutory requirements. They do not cite any statute or court case that allows them to do so.

The DHS Privacy Office has been intimately involved in producing Federal Register filings that claim these exemptions from fundamental statutory Federal record-keeping requirements, and fail to properly disclose the extent of DHS systems of travel records. DHS travel records include information about numerous categories of people not mentioned in the SORNs, from people who pay for other people’s tickets to people whose phone numbers where entered in reservations of houseguests reconfirming flights, as well other information prohibited form collection by the Privacy Act.  In this way, the Privacy Office has actively undermined the Privacy Act that they are sworn to uphold, and has been a party to criminal violations of the Privacy Act in the continued operation of these systems of records.  We’ve gotten no response whatsoever to our repeated formal complaints of these crimes filed with the DHS Privacy Office.

Oct 21 2009

Softball questions for TSA nominee

President Obama’s much-belated nominee to head the Transportation Security Administration, Erroll Southers — faced only softball questioning at a confirmation hearing last week before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  None of the questions we’ve raised for the nominee about TSA policies and procedures, or about the philosophical or practical attitude of the nominee toward the right to travel, were asked by any of the Senators. Nor, despite the nominee’s background of as a policeman (L.A. airport police commander and former FBI agent), was there any exploration of the role of the TSA as the Federal police agency that most often interacts directly with people who are accused of no crime — literally the front lines of Federal policing of innocent citizens.

The nomination of Mr. Southers has also been referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, which plans to hold its own confirmation hearing after it receives further background information from Mr. Southers, probably in late November.

If you want to know whether the Obama Administration and its nominee plan to set a new course for the TSA, let your Senators and the members of the Homeland Security know that you want them to ask tough questions (“Do we have a right to travel? Should the obligations of travelers at TSA checkpoints be spelled out in publicly-disclosed regulations?  Should no-fly decisions be subject to judicial review? Should we have to show ID to fly? Should the government keep records of our travels?”) before they vote to approve any nominee for TSA Administrator.

Sep 28 2009

Now that Ted Kennedy’s dead, the TSA’s found somebody else in Congress to harass

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) used to have constant trouble at airports because a name similar to his was on the TSA’s “no-fly” list.  Even as a senior Senator he couldn’t find out why, and couldn’t get the harassment stopped (which he eventually mentioned publicly during a Senate hearing) for more than three weeks.  For ordinary mortals, “redress” takes months or years, if it ever happens at all.

Now it’s Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) — sponsor of the amendment passed overwhelmingly by the House in June, despite opposition from the leadership of both major parties, to restrict the TSA’s use of virtual strip search (“Whole Body Imaging”) machines at checkpoints in airports — who’s gotten on the TSA’s VIP list for special treatment.

According to reports in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, frequent-flyer freshman Congressman Chaffetz — who has refused to move to Washington, sleeps on a cot in a back room of his Congressional office during the week, and flies home to Utah to be with his family every weekend — got into trouble at SLC last week after he (1) refused to “consent” to a virtual strip search (“Chaffetz had told the House, “You don’t have to look at my wife and 8-year-old daughter naked to secure an airplane.” He says he didn’t want the TSA looking at him naked either. He told the Deseret News the TSA has not lived up to promises to post signs about what the whole-body imaging machine does”) and then (2) tried to read the name on a TSA agent’s badge (which the agent only showed him after Chaffetz identified himself as a member of Congress, although the TSA agents said they already knew who he was).

Of course, Chaffetz was then “randomly” selected for extra groping (“secondary screening”).  But we’re sure that had nothing to do with his political opinions or attempts to hold the TSA accountable to the laws he helps make.

Aug 16 2009

Secure Flight: Frequently Asked Questions

There’s been a lot of confusing (and often confused) reporting recently about the TSA’s so-called “Secure Flight” scheme for surveillance and control of passengers on domestic U.S. airline flights, based on data mining of airline reservations and lifetime travel histories.

If you’re looking for answers, you might start with our FAQ about “Secure Flight”.

Much of the confusion comes from the fact that the TSA’s orders to the airlines to implement “Secure Flight”, setting out which airlines are required to do what, and when, are all contained in secret “Security Directives”.  So we have only the TSA’s press releases — which they have previously told us would “creat[e] public confusion” were the public actually to rely on them, and which have often proven to be lies anyway — as clues to what is really being required.

We do know, however, the essence of what the “Secure Flight” regulations actually require: the shift to a permssion-based system of control of domestic air travelers (similar to the shift already being made for international air travelers under the APIS regulations, and for land border crossings under the WHTI rules), with a default of, “No”.

In addition to the questions in our original our FAQ, recent news reports raise some additional questions worth answering:

  • Was the “Secure Flight” scheme “[b]orn out of recommendations from the 9/11 Commission” (NPR)? No. “Secure Flight” is the latest name for a program originally called “CAPPS-II”, which was conceived almost immediately after 9/11 and well before the 9/11 Commission was even appointed.  More importantly, “Secure Flight” is directly contrary to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that, “The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use…. [There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.”
  • Is “Secure Flight” a legal “requirement” (TSA press release)? No. Not only is “Secure Flight” (a) in violation of international treaties to which the U.S. is a party (Article 12 of the ICCPR provides in part that, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement”) and (b) the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (“Congress shall make no law … abridging … the right of the people peaceably to assemble”), but (c) the TSA has been expressly forbidden by Federal law from implementing “Secure Flight” “on other than a test basis” unless and until the GAO has certified that 10 specific criteria have been met.  The GAO has moved the goalposts set by Congress to certify that most of those criteria have, under clearly distorted interpretations, been met — but not yet all of them.  The assignment to each would-be passenger of a score of “cleared”, “inhibited”, or “not cleared” appears to violate the provision of the same law that, “None of the funds provided in this or any previous appropriations Act may be utilized to develop or test algorithms assigning risk to passengers whose names are not on government watch lists.”  And “Secure Flight” also potentially violates restrictions on data mining. [Update: It appears that the TSA is interpreting the GAO’s statements as constituting the necessary certification, even though the GAO said that “Additional Actions Are Needed”.  According to Business Travel News, “‘There’s nothing more to be tested, and no more approvals we need,’ said program director Paul Leyh…. ‘All it is now is to start the implementation process.'”]
  • Can the TSA or the airline prevent you flying or impose other sanctions as a penalty for non-compliance with “Secure Flight” requirements such as providing my date of birth, gender, etc? No. [Not unless they can successfully claim that the GAO has made the necessary certification, and that “cleared”, “inhibited”, or “not cleared” is not a “risk score”.] The same law that prohibits the TSA from “deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis” of “Secure Flight” also provides that, “During the testing phase … no information gathered from passengers, foreign or domestic air carriers, or reservation systems may be used to screen aviation passengers, or delay or deny boarding to such passengers, except in instances where passenger names are matched to a government watch list.”