Secret Law – Page 31 – Papers, Please!

Oct 27 2009

TSA sends our FOIA request into a black hole

We learned yesterday from the U.S Postal Service that the TSA has been assigned a new zip code, 20598 (or at least so we were told on the phone by the USPS Customer Affairs department — we have no way to verify whether it’s true, or what the “correct” zip code should be), replacing the former 22202, and has instructed the USPS that they will not accept delivery of anything addressed to zip code 22202. But the TSA still lists 22202 as the zip code for FOIA requests on their Web site, and they have yet to publish a new Federal Register notice officially designating a new FOIA request address.

Our most recent request was under FOIA. But the same address is officially designated for TSA Privacy Act requests on the TSA website and in numerous System of Records Notices (SORNs), and we assume that Privacy Act requests have the same problems.

A FOIA request we sent (by Express Mail, with a request for expedited processing) 12 days ago has gone into a black hole: It hasn’t been returned to us as the sender, but there’s no record of it being delivered. Nor is there any written record of the TSA refusing to accept it or directing the USPS not to attempt to deliver it.

We haven’t been able to find out how long this has been going on, or how many sacks (truckloads?) of mail and how many tens or hundreds of FOIA requests may have been similarly dealt with.

Who’s watching the watchers at the DHS “Privacy” Office?

The Identity Project has joined with more than two dozen other organizations and individual experts from the Privacy Coalition in a joint letter to the House Committee on Homland Security, criticizing the DHS Privacy Office and its annual report and calling for better Congressional oversight of privacy-invasive DHS practices and the DHS Privacy Office itself.

There’s more about the letter, and the DHS response, today in the Washington Post.

We’re pleased to be part of this joint effort, and we hope Congress does more to rein in the DHS — although of course we are disappointed that DHS noncompliance with the law, the Constitution, and international treaties has made such a campaign necessary. The DHS consistently tries to exempt itself from major requirements of the Privacy Act, such as:

Obtaining personal information from the person affected, rather than from third parties.
Making personal information accessible to the person affected.
Giving people a serious opportunity to correct records about them at DHS (or collected and held by “private” entities at DHS behest and used by the DHS).
Only collecting information that is relevant to lawful purposes.
Only collecting information that is timely.
Only collecting information that is accurate.
Only collecting information about categories of individuals disclosed in formal “System of Records Notices” in the Federal Register.
Not collecting information about the First Amendment protected activities of US persons — such as who they are associating with, the books they are carrying or reading, the art or slogans or expressive insignia on their clothing or possessions, or where, why, how, and with whom they are assembling.

DHS claims for itself the ability to “exempt” itself from these statutory requirements. They do not cite any statute or court case that allows them to do so.

The DHS Privacy Office has been intimately involved in producing Federal Register filings that claim these exemptions from fundamental statutory Federal record-keeping requirements, and fail to properly disclose the extent of DHS systems of travel records. DHS travel records include information about numerous categories of people not mentioned in the SORNs, from people who pay for other people’s tickets to people whose phone numbers where entered in reservations of houseguests reconfirming flights, as well other information prohibited form collection by the Privacy Act. In this way, the Privacy Office has actively undermined the Privacy Act that they are sworn to uphold, and has been a party to criminal violations of the Privacy Act in the continued operation of these systems of records. We’ve gotten no response whatsoever to our repeated formal complaints of these crimes filed with the DHS Privacy Office.

Oct 21 2009

Softball questions for TSA nominee

President Obama’s much-belated nominee to head the Transportation Security Administration, Erroll Southers — faced only softball questioning at a confirmation hearing last week before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. None of the questions we’ve raised for the nominee about TSA policies and procedures, or about the philosophical or practical attitude of the nominee toward the right to travel, were asked by any of the Senators. Nor, despite the nominee’s background of as a policeman (L.A. airport police commander and former FBI agent), was there any exploration of the role of the TSA as the Federal police agency that most often interacts directly with people who are accused of no crime — literally the front lines of Federal policing of innocent citizens.

The nomination of Mr. Southers has also been referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, which plans to hold its own confirmation hearing after it receives further background information from Mr. Southers, probably in late November.

If you want to know whether the Obama Administration and its nominee plan to set a new course for the TSA, let your Senators and the members of the Homeland Security know that you want them to ask tough questions (“Do we have a right to travel? Should the obligations of travelers at TSA checkpoints be spelled out in publicly-disclosed regulations? Should no-fly decisions be subject to judicial review? Should we have to show ID to fly? Should the government keep records of our travels?”) before they vote to approve any nominee for TSA Administrator.

Sep 28 2009

Now that Ted Kennedy’s dead, the TSA’s found somebody else in Congress to harass

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) used to have constant trouble at airports because a name similar to his was on the TSA’s “no-fly” list. Even as a senior Senator he couldn’t find out why, and couldn’t get the harassment stopped (which he eventually mentioned publicly during a Senate hearing) for more than three weeks. For ordinary mortals, “redress” takes months or years, if it ever happens at all.

Now it’s Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) — sponsor of the amendment passed overwhelmingly by the House in June, despite opposition from the leadership of both major parties, to restrict the TSA’s use of virtual strip search (“Whole Body Imaging”) machines at checkpoints in airports — who’s gotten on the TSA’s VIP list for special treatment.

According to reports in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, frequent-flyer freshman Congressman Chaffetz — who has refused to move to Washington, sleeps on a cot in a back room of his Congressional office during the week, and flies home to Utah to be with his family every weekend — got into trouble at SLC last week after he (1) refused to “consent” to a virtual strip search (“Chaffetz had told the House, “You don’t have to look at my wife and 8-year-old daughter naked to secure an airplane.” He says he didn’t want the TSA looking at him naked either. He told the Deseret News the TSA has not lived up to promises to post signs about what the whole-body imaging machine does”) and then (2) tried to read the name on a TSA agent’s badge (which the agent only showed him after Chaffetz identified himself as a member of Congress, although the TSA agents said they already knew who he was).

Of course, Chaffetz was then “randomly” selected for extra groping (“secondary screening”). But we’re sure that had nothing to do with his political opinions or attempts to hold the TSA accountable to the laws he helps make.

Aug 16 2009

Secure Flight: Frequently Asked Questions

There’s been a lot of confusing (and often confused) reporting recently about the TSA’s so-called “Secure Flight” scheme for surveillance and control of passengers on domestic U.S. airline flights, based on data mining of airline reservations and lifetime travel histories.

If you’re looking for answers, you might start with our FAQ about “Secure Flight”.

Much of the confusion comes from the fact that the TSA’s orders to the airlines to implement “Secure Flight”, setting out which airlines are required to do what, and when, are all contained in secret “Security Directives”. So we have only the TSA’s press releases — which they have previously told us would “creat[e] public confusion” were the public actually to rely on them, and which have often proven to be lies anyway — as clues to what is really being required.

We do know, however, the essence of what the “Secure Flight” regulations actually require: the shift to a permssion-based system of control of domestic air travelers (similar to the shift already being made for international air travelers under the APIS regulations, and for land border crossings under the WHTI rules), with a default of, “No”.

In addition to the questions in our original our FAQ, recent news reports raise some additional questions worth answering:

Was the “Secure Flight” scheme “[b]orn out of recommendations from the 9/11 Commission” (NPR)? No. “Secure Flight” is the latest name for a program originally called “CAPPS-II”, which was conceived almost immediately after 9/11 and well before the 9/11 Commission was even appointed. More importantly, “Secure Flight” is directly contrary to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that, “The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use…. [There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.”
Is “Secure Flight” a legal “requirement” (TSA press release)? No. Not only is “Secure Flight” (a) in violation of international treaties to which the U.S. is a party (Article 12 of the ICCPR provides in part that, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement”) and (b) the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (“Congress shall make no law … abridging … the right of the people peaceably to assemble”), but (c) the TSA has been expressly forbidden by Federal law from implementing “Secure Flight” “on other than a test basis” unless and until the GAO has certified that 10 specific criteria have been met. The GAO has moved the goalposts set by Congress to certify that most of those criteria have, under clearly distorted interpretations, been met — but not yet all of them. The assignment to each would-be passenger of a score of “cleared”, “inhibited”, or “not cleared” appears to violate the provision of the same law that, “None of the funds provided in this or any previous appropriations Act may be utilized to develop or test algorithms assigning risk to passengers whose names are not on government watch lists.” And “Secure Flight” also potentially violates restrictions on data mining. [Update: It appears that the TSA is interpreting the GAO’s statements as constituting the necessary certification, even though the GAO said that “Additional Actions Are Needed”. According to Business Travel News, “‘There’s nothing more to be tested, and no more approvals we need,’ said program director Paul Leyh…. ‘All it is now is to start the implementation process.'”]
Can the TSA or the airline prevent you flying or impose other sanctions as a penalty for non-compliance with “Secure Flight” requirements such as providing my date of birth, gender, etc? No. [Not unless they can successfully claim that the GAO has made the necessary certification, and that “cleared”, “inhibited”, or “not cleared” is not a “risk score”.] The same law that prohibits the TSA from “deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis” of “Secure Flight” also provides that, “During the testing phase … no information gathered from passengers, foreign or domestic air carriers, or reservation systems may be used to screen aviation passengers, or delay or deny boarding to such passengers, except in instances where passenger names are matched to a government watch list.”

Jun 25 2009

Courts and Congress finally start to rein in the TSA

Until recently, the TSA has been a domestic legal Guantanamo, and the TSA has treated their domain of “checkpoints” and travel control and surveillance as a law-free zone where their powers of search, seizure, detention, and denial of passage were unconstrained by the Constitution, human rights treaties, judicial review, or stautory or regulatory standards. As indeed it has been: Congress has enacted no law specifically defining any limits on the authority of TSA agents at checkpoints (or elsewhere), and the TSA itself has never conducted any rulemaking or issued any publicly-disclosed regulations defining its authority, the limits of that authority, what orders travellers do or don’t have to comply with, and which forms of “noncooperation” are considered grounds for which sanctions (more intrusive search, denial of transportation, admninistrative fine, detention, etc.). While the TSA has never been explicitly exempted from the Constitution or treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the DHS has sought to avoid ever allowing judicial review of fly/no-fly decisions, and the courts themselves have gone out of their way to avoid ruling on the legality of TSA actions — such as when the 9th Circuit invented a counter-factual claim (without ever allowing an evidentiary hearing on the facts) that John Gilmore hadn’t actually been required to show ID credentials in order to fly, as a way to avoid ruling on whether an ID-to-fly requirement would be Constitutional. As for the Executive, President Obama has yet to nominate an Administrator of the TSA, leaving this one of the highest-ranking vacancies in the Administration and leaving the TSA operating on autopilot under lame-duck holdovers.

In the absence of any explicit rules or any judicial, legislative, or executive oversight, the TSA has felt no need to seek authority for its ever-expanding assertions of authority through legislation or rulemaking. Nor has the TSA recognized any duty of self-restraint or self-policing to ensure its actions conform to the law. Instead, the TSA has simply wielded its power to do whatever it wished, on the disgraceful assumption that, “If we’re doing something wrong, the courts will tell us — if and when someone can afford to sue us, and they win a court judgment against us.” In the meantime, the TSA will do, and claim the right to do, anything that hasn’t already specifically been ruled illegal. Kind of like the thief who assumes that they can steal whatever they want, and that if something turns out not be theirs, they’ll give it back if and when someone sues and wins a court judgment ordering its return.

Time and again we’ve pointed out this failure to subject the TSA to the rule of law. See, for example, our most recent prior post on this topic, our agenda on the right to travel submitted to the Obama Administration and Congress after the 2008 elections, and our comments earlier this month at the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy conference session with Obama Administration representatives and others at 1:45:53 of this video. Until recently, however, neither the Courts, the Congress, nor the Executive branch have wanted to confront the question of what rules govern the TSA.

We’re please to report that this is finally beginiing to change, in small ways but on numerous fronts:

Are there any rules at airport checkpoints?

We had a chance to ask some questions (starting at 55:00 of the video, although the entire panel is worth watching) of the TSA’s Chief Privacy Officer, Peter Pietra, when he showed up at the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy conference to talk about the SPOT program, under which roving teams of TSA agents watch people in airports for a (secret, of course) checklist of “suspicious” behavior, question some of those people, and finger some of them for more intrusive search or further questioning when they reach the “screening” checkpoints.

Petra claimed that, “There isn’t any search or seizure … until the checkpoint”, even if you decline to respond to questions from the SPOT teams or other TSA agents. But, “At the checkpoint, it’s a different story … There’s a ‘special circumstances’ exception that would permit at least a reasonable search.”

But what does the TSA consider “reasonable”? In particular, once we get to the checkpoint, are we required to answer questions from the TSA?

“I don’t know,” Petra said.

If we decline to answer questions at a TSA checkpoint, does the TSA claim the authority to detain us, prevent us from traveling, or impose administrative sanctions? Or is the maximum penalty for declining to answer TSA questions having to submit to a pat-down search and hand search of our carry-on baggage (“secondary screening”)?

“Once you get to the checkpoint, you have to ‘cooperate’ with screening.”

What does “cooperate” mean? Are there any guidelines that tell us what we are required to do to consitutute “cooperation” with screening at a checkpoint?

“I don’t know,” Petra again answered.

We asked Petra to try to find out, but we won’t hold our breath waiting for an answer.

Jun 01 2009

Today we’re all prisoners in the USA

As of today, June 1, 2009, even U.S. citizens are officially prisoners in the USA, or exiles barred from entering our own country without the government’s permission.

We are now forbidden by Federal regulations from leaving or entering the USA, anywhere, by any means — by air, by sea, or by land, to or from any other country or international waters or airspace — unless the government chooses to issue us a passport, passport card, or “enhanced” drivers license (any of which “travel documents” are now issued only with secretly and remotely-readable uniquely-numbered radio tracking beacons in the form of RFID transponder chips), or unless the Department of Homeland Security chooses to to exercise its standardless “discretion” to decide — in secret, with no way for us to know who is making the decision or on what basis — to issue a (one-time case-by-case) “waiver” of the new travel document requirements.

If you’re in the USA without such documents — even if you were born here, or are a foreigner who entered the USA legally without such documents (a Canadian, for example, who entered the USA by land yesterday when no such documents were yet required), or your document(s) have expired or have been lost or stolen — you are forbidden to leave the country unless and until you procure such a document, or unless and until the DHS gives you an exit permit in the form of a discretionary one-time waiver to leave the country — but not necessarily to come home, unless they again exercise their discretion to “grant” you another waiver.

If you are a U.S. citizen abroad without such a document (for example, if you entered Canada legally without it yesterday by land, when it wasn’t required, or again if your document(s) are expired, lost, or stolen) you are forbidden to come home unless and until you can procure a new document acceptable to the DHS, or unless and until the DHS gives you permission to come home in the form of a discretionary one-time waiver. Read More →

May 26 2009

TSA releases (censored) ID checking procedures

In response to a request by the Identity Project under the Freedom of Information Act, the TSA has for the first time given us a (redacted) version of the section on Travel Document and ID Checks from the TSA’s “Screening Management SOP” (Standard Operating Procedures) manual. Our request was made June 21, 2008, the day the TSA announced what they claimed were changes to ID “requirements” for air travelers. It took the TSA almost seven months to respond.

The version of the SOP manual which the TSA has now made public is dated June 30, 2008, so it ought to reflect the changes announced in the TSA’s June 21, 2008 press release. But there is nothing at all in the sections of the manual the TSA has released about the new procedures and new ID verification form which the TSA had, in fact, started using. Rather than requiring people who don’t have or don’t choose to show government-issued ID credentials to execute affidavits stating who they are under penalty of perjury, the TSA procedures manual requires that such people be allowed to proceed through secondary screening as “selectees”, and specifically directs screeners and other TSA staff not to make any attempt to detain or delay them.

GAO moves the goalposts to “approve” Secure Flight

We were surprised last week to see that the GAO has issued a report certifying that, “As of April 2009, TSA had generally achieved 9 of the 10 statutory conditions related to the development of the Secure Flight program and had conditionally achieved 1 condition (TSA had defined plans, but had not completed all activities for this condition).”

Surprised, that is, until we we saw how the GAO had defined (re-defined?) those statutory conditions in ways very different from what we thought they meant, or what we think Congress thought they meant: Read More →