Dec 01 2013

First “no-fly” trial to begin this week in San Francisco

For the first time ever, a lawsuit challenging a U.S. government “no-fly” order goes to trial on Monday.

The U.S. government issues “no-fly” orders (or “no-board recommendations“, of which there were almost 10,000 last year) to airlines, forbidding common carriers from transporting specified persons.  The administrative decisions to issue these orders are made in secret, on the basis of secret allegedly “derogatory” evidence (or no evidence at all), according to secret criteria (or no criteria at all), at the “discretion” of the agencies that “nominate” individuals for inclusion on the “no-fly” list).

Airlines aren’t told why they have been forbidden to transport any particular person, and are forbidden from telling anyone that they are on the “no-fly” list — although of course that eventually becomes obvious when the airline refuses to issue a boarding pass to an otherwise qualified fare-paying would-be passenger.  The U.S. government’s policy is never to confirm or deny the existence of a no-fly order. That is considered a “state secret”.

Needless to say, all this makes a mockery of due process and has, until now, frustrated judicial review of no-fly decisions and orders.  Despite numerous attempts to challenge the system of “no-fly” lists and orders, Rahinah Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, et al. (docket and more recent documents) is the first such case to make it to trial.

Dr. Ibrahim, a Malaysian citizen, was a doctoral candidate at Stanford University, in the U.S. on a valid student visa, when she tried to fly home to Malaysia with her daughter in 2005.  She was refused passage on a United Airlines flight from San Francisco International Airport, detained, and interrogated by SFO airport police.  Although she was ultimately bound for Malaysia, she had planned to stop over in Hawaii to present a research paper at a conference there. She was denied boarding on a domestic flight from San Francisco to Kona. (Since this was a domestic flight, the no-fly instructions would have been transmitted through the TSA’s “Secure Flight” system.) She was allowed to fly to Kona the next day, and on to Malaysia after the conference a few days late, but her U.S. visa was then revoked (although she wasn’t notified, and didn’t learn this until she was at the airport in K.L. trying to check in for a flight back to SFO a couple of months later). She hasn’t been able to return to the U.S. since, even though she had lived legally in the U.S. for many years, had met and married her husband in the U.S., and one of her children was born in the U.S. and is a U.S. citizen.  She completed her dissertation remotely, received her Stanford Ph.D. in absentia, and is now a professor at a major Malaysian public university, with an extensive list of academic publications.

Several other “no-fly” lawsuits have been dismissed without getting far enough to have a judge, much less a jury, review the challenged “no-fly” orders on their merits. Others that haven’t yet made it to trial, but haven’t yet been dismissed, include that of Gulet Mohamed in Northern Virgina and Latif et al. v. Holder in Portland, OR.  Both of these cases involve U.S. citizens who were effectively banished from the U.S. by having their names being placed on the “no-fly” list while they were abroad, preventing them from coming home.

The city and county of San Francisco paid Dr. Ibrahim $225,000 to settle her claims against the airport police, but the Federal government agencies and employees have opposed Dr. Ibrahim’s right to even have the court review the legality of their actions.

The Federal defendants being sued by Dr. Ibrahim have twice appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, but twice failed to get the case dismissed before trial.  Next, they tried to get Judge Alsup to follow the DHS’s own original decision-making procedure and dismiss the case on the basis of secret evidence they proposed to submit in camera and under seal (so that neither Dr. Ibrahim nor her lawyers could see or contested the allegations against her).   At that point, Judge Alsup refused even to look at the profferred secret evidence, declaring that travel is a right that cannot be denied without “an effective means of redress”.

Next the government invoked the “state secrets” privilege against disclosing certain information about whether, and if so, why and how, it had ordered airlines not to transport Dr. Ibrahim. Judge Alsup allowed the government to withhold much of this information, but again refused to dismiss the complaint entirely, ordering the parties to prepare for trial and allowing Dr. Ibrahim a chance to try to prove her case on the basis of other evidence.

Since that ruling in April of this year, ordering the parties to proceed, there have been continuing disputes over discovery and depositions. Judge Alsup has issued rulings denying Dr. Ibrahim’s requests to amend her complaint and for additional discovery related to whether she was the subject of NSA surveillance or this formed part of the basis for the no-fly order against her; prohibiting the government from using any evidence to defend itself that wasn’t disclosed to Dr. Ibrahim and her lawyers; and setting the case for trial on the remaining issues.

Judge Alsup himself has already seen the secret evidence that he has forbidden the government to introduce or rely on in the trial, as part of his in camera review of whether it had to be disclosed to DR. Ibrahim and her lawyers. But Judge Alsup refused to recuse himself or assign the case for trial by a judge who hasn’t seen the secret evidence that isn’t supposed to be considered in reaching a verdict.  Judge Alsup claims to believe that unlike a jury, he can pretend that he never saw this secret evidence, and reach an impartial verdict that disregards it. This sort of pretense is bizarre and unrealistic but routine in bench trials.

The trial in Dr. Ibrahim’s case is scheduled to start Monday, December 2nd, and continue through Monday, December 10th, before Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Courtroom 8  (19th Floor), Phillip Burton Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Ave, San Francisco. The trial will begin each weekday at 7:30 a.m. and recess at 1:30-2:30 p.m. depending on the day.

No immediate decision on the facts or the law is expected. The judge in a Federal trial like this will typically issue a written verdict some weeks or months after the end of the trial.

Despite the Constitutional right to a “public” trial, government-issued ID credentials are required for admission to the Federal Building.  Under the court’s General Order 58 (“Regulating Possession and Use of Electronic Devices in the Courthouse”), cell phones, laptop computers, and other electronic devices are allowed in the courthouse (subject to being inspected and deemed not to be dangerous by the guards at the entrance), and can be used in the lobby,  hallways, etc., but can’t be used in courtrooms without special permission. Cameras and recording devices are also allowed in the building, but can’t be used anywhere inside.  Photography and recording, long prohibited in Federal courts, are permitted in the Northern District of California only as part of a pilot project and only in cases selected by the court in its discretion.

At the end of the day, the U.S. government is likely to claim that Dr. Ibrahim was allowed her day in court. But that will be a day in court in which the allegedly derogatory allegations against her, and any evidence purportedly supporting them, will remain secret from her  but will have been provided to the deciding judge.

Nov 19 2013

Does the TSA have any “precogs”?

The TSA uses appearance profiles to decide whether to search you and/or your luggage, interrogate you, call the police, or allow you to fly. (Diagram from GAO report.)[The TSA uses appearance profiles to decide whether to search you and/or your luggage, interrogate you, call the police, or allow you to fly. (Diagram from GAO report. Click image for larger version.)”]

We’ve likened the TSA’s attempts to predict which travelers are would-be terrorists on the basis of  their identities and profiles to the “pre-crime” police in the fictional film, Minority Report, who use “pre-cogs” with supernatural powers to predict who will commit future crimes.

We’ve also pointed out that in reality, as distinct from Hollywood fantasy, there’s no such thing as a “precog”. The Constitution presumes that we are innocent until proved guilty, and requires probable cause (as determined by a judge, not a self-proclaimed or TSA-certified psychic) to believe that we have already committed a crime before we can lawfully be arrested.

Having said that, we’re pleased to see that members of Congress and government auditors are (finally) beginning to come to their senses — as the characters in “Minority Report” eventually did — and questioning whether the TSA really has any “pre-cogs” on its payroll, or what the TSA has gotten for its $900 million outlay on “Behavior Detection Officers” and “Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques” (SPOT).

At a hearing last week before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Rep. Mark Sanford asked John Pistole, the former FBI agent who is now Administrator of the TSA, whether travelers should “have to go through a screening process based on somebody’s interpretation of what might be in your brain.” Rep. Sanford pointed that a wide variety of factors — including the TSA’s own actions — might lead to stress, fear, and the “behaviors” that the TSA has defined in a (secret) point-scoring system as indicia of terrorist intentions.

In response, Pistole admitted that, “There’s no perfect science, there’s no perfect art of this.”

“Imperfect” isn’t the right word for the SPOT program. In fact, there’s no scientific basis for it at all, according to a report and testimony at the same hearing by the Government Accountability Office.

In addition to a detailed debunking of the lack of scientific evidence to support the TSA’s claims to paranormal ability,  the GAO report gives more information than has previously been made public concerning what the TSA’s “behavior detection officers” (BDOs) actually do.

The TSA’s goal is mind reading. TSA “Behavior Detection Officers” (BDOs) are supposely trained to deduce mental states from external appearances and visible behaviors:

According to TSA’s strategic plan and other program guidance for the BDA [Behavior Detection and Analysis] program released in December 2012, the goal of the agency’s behavior detection activities, including the SPOT program, is to identify high-risk passengers based on behavioral indicators that indicate “mal-intent.”

But can BDOs read our minds?  Presumably, the measure of their success in doing so would be how many (if any) of the travelers they flag as “mal-intentioned” are eventually found guilty of aviation-related terrorist offenses.  Does that ever happen?  The GAO couldn’t tell, because the TSA doesn’t keep records of that:

TSA was unable to provide documentation to support the number of referrals that were forwarded to law enforcement for further investigation for potential ties to terrorism. Further, according to FAMS [Federal Air Marshalls Service] officials, when referrals in TISS [Transportation Information Sharing System] are forwarded to other law enforcement officials for further investigation, the FAMS officials do not necessarily identify why the referral is being forwarded. That is, it would not be possible to identify referrals that were forwarded because of concerns associated with terrorism versus referrals that were forwarded because of other concerns, such as drug smuggling. [emphasis added]

Like most TSA personnel, and despite the job title of “officer”, BDOs and TSOs are not law enforcement officers.  As the diagram above makes clear, they can and do impose “administrative” sanctions including more intrusive searches of travelers and our luggage, interrogation of travelers, and denial of the right to travel. The TSA also claims the right to impose administrative fines for insufficient, or insufficiently groveling, “cooperation” with their search, interrogation, or anything else it decides is part of “screening”.  But beyond that, unless they want to take the risk of liability for making a citizens arrest, TSA employees and contractors depend on local law enforcement officers (LEOs) to provide their muscle.

What happens when the TSA refers travelers picked out by its BDO “pre-cogs” to local police?

99.4 percent of the passengers that were selected for referral screening — that is further questioning and inspection by a BDO — were not arrested. The percentage of passengers referred to LEOs that were arrested was about 4 percent; the other 96 percent of passengers referred to LEOs were not arrested. The SPOT database identifies 6 reasons for arrest, including (1) fraudulent documents, (2) illegal alien, (3) other, (4) outstanding warrants, (5) suspected drugs, and (6) undeclared currency…. According to the validation study, the majority of the arrested passengers were arrested because of possession of a controlled substance. [emphasis added]

“Terrorist” offenses aren’t even a sufficiently large proportion of TSA checkpoint arrests to warrant their own category in the database. If there were any at all, they are merely a subset of the “miscellaneous” category.

Rather than predicting terrorist intent, the TSA is using the “behavior detection” program as a pretext for warrantless searches for general law enforcement purposes, primarily for enforcement of drug laws.  That’s exactly the sort of pretextual use of a special-purpose administrative checkpoint detention and search as a general-purpose law enforcement dragnet which, as numerous courts have recognized, is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Any actual interdiction of would-be terrorists is so infrequent and insignificant (or of so little relevance to the true purposes and criteria for success of the program) as not to be worth bothering to track.

Both the GAO (Congressional auditors) and the DHS’s own Office of Inspector General (OIG), in separate audits and investigations, found evidence that these warrentless searches and other sanctions were being imposed on the basis of “appearance profiles”, including profiles of ethnic and racial appearance:

With regard to information provided related to profiling, DHS stated that DHS’s OIG completed an investigation at the request of TSA into allegations that surfaced at Boston Logan Airport [“These accusations included written complaints from BDOs who claimed other BDOs were selecting passengers for referral screening based on their ethnic or racial appearance.”] and concluded that these allegations could not be substantiated. However,  while the OIG’s July 2013 report of investigation on behavior detection officers in Boston concluded that “there was no indication that BDOs racially profiled passengers in order to meet production quotas,” the OIG’s report also stated that there was evidence of “appearance profiling.”

In other words, the DHS’s own investigators found that the TSA was basing its decisions (searches, interrogations, no-fly orders, referrals to police, etc.) on the basis of racial and ethnic appearance profiles — it just wasn’t using racial and ethnic profiling to meet specific quotas. All profiling by BDOs is, of course, “appearance profiling”, since all that BDOs are able to observe is external appearance. Is the absence of explicit racial or ethnic quotas supposed to make such profiling OK?

GAO auditors also received first-hand complaints of profiling from BDOs at every airport they visited:

During our visits to four airports, we asked a random sample of 25 BDOs at the airports to what extent they had seen BDOs in their airport referring passengers based on race, national origin, or appearance rather than behaviors…. Of the 25 randomly selected BDOs we interviewed, 20 said they had not witnessed profiling, and 5 BDOs (including at least 1 from each of the four airports we visited) said that profiling was occurring at their airports, according to their personal observations. Also, 7 additional BDOs contacted us over the course of our review to express concern about the profiling of passengers that they had witnessed.

If there is any small silver lining in the GAO’s latest report, it’s that despite complete disregard for the Fourth Amendment, the TSA has at least begun to pay lip service to the Fifth Amendment rights of travelers to remain silent when questioned by TSA employees or contractors:

In August 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum directing TSA to take a number of actions… These actions include a revision of the SPOT standard operating procedures to, among other things, clarify that passengers who are unwilling or uncomfortable with participating in an interactive discussion and responding to questions will not be pressured by BDOs to do so. [emphasis added]

Oct 22 2013

TSA’s lying “response” to today’s story in the New York Times

We’re quoted on the front page of today’s New York Times in a story by Susan Stellin, “Security Check Now Starts Long Before You Fly”:

The Transportation Security Administration is expanding its screening of passengers before they arrive at the airport by searching a wide array of government and private databases that can include records like car registrations and employment information….

“I think the best way to look at it is as a pre-crime assessment every time you fly,” said Edward Hasbrouck, a consultant to the Identity Project, one of the groups that oppose the prescreening initiatives. “The default will be the highest, most intrusive level of search, and anything less will be conditioned on providing some additional information in some fashion.”

More:

The TSA refused to say anything to the Times on the record, but published a blog post today (with the misleading title “Expediting Screening for the Traveling Public”) responding to the Times’ story with a succession of lies and prevarications.

We call “bullshit” on the TSA:

  • “We are not using “private databases.”” This is an out-and-out lie, as “Blogger Bob” and the TSA surely know. All TSA pre-secreening systems relie primarily on information from private commercial databases of airline reservations (PNRs). Since there is no requirement for a U.S. citizen to notify the government directly before taking a trip by common carrier, “pre-screening” would be impossible without access to, and reliance on, these private commercial databases. The US government has gone to great effort, through the APIS,  PNR, and Secure Flight regulations and through lobbying for changes to Canadian privacy law and exceptions to European privacy law, to implement requirements for DHS access to this data.  If these databases are no longer “private”, that is only because the TSA and other DHS components have compelled airlines and reservation hosting companies to make this data available to government agencies.
  • “TSA does not monitor a passenger’s length of stay in any location.” The TSA doesn’t always retain the travel itinerary information it compels airlines to provide for domestic travel, but it claims the right to do so for anyone deemed (arbitrarily or according to secret criteria) to be “suspicious” or to “match” an entry on any of the government’s (arbitrary, secret) “watchlists”.  And for international travel, CBP (another DHS component agency) does retain complete PNR data, including travel itineraries, and comprehensive border crossing and entry/exit logs, for all travelers, in its Automated Targeting System (ATS) — and claims the right to “share” all this data with the TSA. (And that doesn’t even begin to consider the NSA’s apparently independent hacking of airlines and reservation systems and potential sharing of PNR and other travel data with DHS.)
  • “We are not using car registrations.” Again, it’s CBP rather than the TSA that is logging license plates and vehicle movements (using cameras near borders and optical character recognition software), linking them to individual ATS records, and using them to generate “risk” scores and watchlist messages — which are then passed on to the TSA.  TSA is using this data, just (slightly) indirectly. According to the latest System Of Records Notice for ATS, published in the Federal Register in 2012, “ATS maintains the official record for … the combination of license plate, Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) registration data and biographical data associated with a border crossing”.
  • “[W]e rely on the same security information passengers have been required to submit at time of booking for many years…. [T]he info we rely on is the same info that passengers have provided for years when they book their flight.” Actually, we didn’t used to have to provide our ID number, date of birth, or gender in order to make an airline (or Amtrak train, or Greyhound bus) reservation. It used to be possible to hold airline reservations in “dummy” names, or with no names at all. The TSA relies on information that has only been required since the creation of the TSA. And in the past, we “provided” that information, if at all, only to airlines and travel companies. Prior to the creation of the TSA, we never had to provide any information to the government to book a flight.  (Unless we were traveling in a foreign country where a foreign government agency like the Stasi required us to show our ID cards or permission papers to book a flight.)
  • “Anyone who has never traveled outside the United States would not have a passport number on file and would therefore not be subject to the rules that the agency uses to determine risk.” Nonsense. Many people have our passport numbers on file with the TSA because we’ve used our passports as ID for domestic flights.  Many people have no government-issued ID except a passport.  Despite the State Department’s moves to make it more difficult to get a passport, the REAL-ID  law sometimes makes it even more difficult to get a drivers license or other state-issued ID than to get a passport.
  • “We are not expanding the type of information we use.” If that were true, why would the TSA have published formal notices in the Federal Register of new systems of records and new uses for existing systems of records?  They don’t publish these legal notices just for fun. Either (a) the TSA has already been illegally collecting and/or using this data without proper notice, in violation of the Privacy Act (as DHS did for years with the Automated Targeting System), (b) the TSA is doing what is says in the notices it is doing, and collecting and using new information in new ways, or (c) the TSA plans to do so in the future, and wants to be able to say, if someone later complains, “But we gave you fair notice that this was what we were going to do. If you wanted to object, you should have done so back in 2013 when we published that notice.”
  • “[W]e are not using any new data to determine low risk passengers.” Applicants for the TSA’s Pre-Check program — i.e. people who want to be relieved of suspicion-by-default and the associated more intrusive search each time they travel — are being required to provide information that the TSA has never before requested, including fingerprints, other biometric information, and authorization for checks of criminal, financial, and other government and commercial records.  If the TSA isn’t using any of this new data, why is it compiling it? More than likely, this new data is being or will soon be used — and retained for possible additional future uses for an unknown range of purposes.

[TSA Pre-Crime graphic from Leaksource]

Oct 10 2013

TSA proposes arbitrarily individualized surveillance-based searches

In the latest version of TSA’s endless series of “trusted traveler” (or “less mistrusted traveler”) schemes, the agency is currently proposing to impose more intrusive searches on any traveler who doesn’t “voluntarily” enroll in the TSA Pre-Check program and authorize the TSA to create a new permanent file with everything from your fingerprints to any “other information provided by … government agencies or other entities”.

These files would be exempted from the normal requirements of the Privacy Act that records used as the basis for decisions about individuals’ exercise of our rights be made available to us and be limited to information that is sufficiently accurate, complete, and relevant to form a legitimate basis for such decisions.

The proposal is contained in a package of three regulatory filings (one new and one revised “System of Records Notice” and a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” proposing Privacy Act exemptions) published last month in the Federal Register.  All three have to be read in combination to appreciate their full implications.

The deadline for public comments on two of these proposals is today, and for the third is tomorrow. We filed consolidated comments today objecting to all three of these proposals:

Read in combination, this new and revised SORN and these proposed regulations describe a system in which an essentially unlimited range of personal information collected from an essentially unlimited range of sources, and known to include inaccurate and irrelevant information, would be (or perhaps already is being) compiled into the “TSA Pre-Check Application Program” system of records.

These records would be used – either according to criteria which are illegally being kept secret, or in an entirely arbitrary manner at the “discretion” of the TSA – to determine who is and who is not deemed “eligible” to exercise the right to travel without being subject to unreasonable searches.

The results of that decision-making would be incorporated into the “Secure Flight” system of records, and used as part of the basis (also either pursuant to secret rules or entirely arbitrarily) for deciding to issue or withhold the issuance of individualized “boarding pass printing results”, including instructions to TSA staff and contractors as to the degree of intrusiveness of the search to which each would-be traveler is to be subjected as a condition of exercising our right to travel.

Maintenance and use of these systems of records in the manner contemplated by these SORNs and the proposed exemptions would violate the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the presumption of innocence, due process, the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act, and Article 12 (Freedom of Movement) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR.

These records should be expunged, and the proposed regulations should be withdrawn….

We also point out that the TSA is only pretending to give the required consideration to public comments:

According to the “TSA Pre-Check Application Program” SORN published on September 10, 2013, “The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted certain records from this system from the notification, access, and amendment procedures of the Privacy Act because it may contain records or information related to law enforcement or national security purposes.”

This claim was, and is, false. As of the date of the SORN, no such exemption had even been proposed: the NPRM proposing such an exemption, and requesting public comments (such as this one) concerning that proposed exemption for consideration by the DHS, was not published until a day later, on September 11, 2013. Even now, the Secretary has promulgated no final rule for such an exemption. Nor could he or she promulgate any such final rule, consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, unless and until the current period for public comment on the proposed exemption rule has concluded and the comments submitted (including these comments) have been considered by the DHS.

The false claim that “The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted certain records from this system from the notification, access, and amendment procedures of the Privacy Act”, when in fact the Secretary has not done so, appears to be intended to mislead individuals about what rights we have, and to dissuade us from attempting to exercise our rights.  In addition, by stating the outcome of the current exemption rulemaking as a fait accompli, it constitutes prima facie evidence of bad faith in the consideration of public comments. It is not enough for an agency to accept submissions of comments from the public to the circular file, after making a decision. An agency must give genuine consideration to public comments before deciding whether to finalize, modify, or withdraw a proposed rule.

You can read our complete comments here. You can submit comments at Regulations gov (here, here , and here) but your comments won’t be processed or visible online until after the DHS Privacy Office re-opens.

[TSA Pre-Crime graphic from Leaksource]

Sep 05 2013

How the TSA treats FOIA requesters it doesn’t like

The more we learn about the TSA’s handling of our Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) requests, the uglier it gets. The latest chapter in the TSA’s vendetta against us is described in a FOIA appeal we filed this week.

The DHS, which of course includes the TSA, has long had a department-wide policy requiring special political approval — and often delay — of all FOIA requests from media, watchdog, or activist individuals or organizations, which we know included requests from The Identity Project.

In addition, we have now obtained less redacted versions of internal TSA and DHS email messages (which were officially released to us only with the most incriminating portions blacked out) showing that the TSA’s Chief Privacy Officer engaged in a campaign of character assassination intended to persuade TSA FOIA staff that individuals associated with The Identity Project are lunatics and liars and hold particular opinions and beliefs as a result of which we and our requests should be ignored or not taken seriously.

(Click image for larger version.)

In the libelous internal TSA email message reproduced above, TSA Privacy Officer Peter Pietra had this to say about Edward Hasbrouck, a consultant to The Identity Project who has filed many of our FOIA requests (and asked questions of Mr. Petra and filed other FOIA requests for records related to Mr. Petra’s work):

Ed is crazy as a loon, and as rude and belligerent at [sic] Bill says…. He misrepresents any interaction you have with him, so be wary (even where there is video that contradicts his version of events). He also thought 9/11 was a govt conspiracy because the FBI investigated it instead of the NTSB.

This message was distributed to TSA FOIA officers including those involved in processing our FOIA requests. And it was sent — the TSA itself later found — with the intention of influencing their decisions.

Even if Mr. Hasbrouck held these opinions and beliefs (which he doesn’t — the allegations about his opinions and beliefs are pure fabrications by TSA staff), who we are or what individuals associated with our organization think or believe is irrelevant to our entitlement to access government records pursuant to FOIA.

Attempting to induce FOIA staff to base FOIA processing or decisions on their opinions of the requesters’ beliefs is among the most serious forms of possible misconduct by officials responsible for compliance with FOIA.

If there’s anything worse, it’s withholding requested government records in order to cover up offical misconduct. But that’s exactly what happened when we requested the email message above.

The TSA’s Chief FOIA Officer and FOIA Public Liaison, Yvonne Coates, redacted the libelous portions of the message on the grounds that they were part of the decision-making process (even though she knows that making FOIA decision on the basis of who we are or what we believe is forbidden by FOIA) and that disclosure of these portions of the message “would injure the quality of future agency decisions by discouraging the open and frank policy discussions between subordinates and superiors”:

(Click image for larger version.)

The dismal track record of DHS and TSA noncompliance with FOIA began with the creation of these agencies during the Bush administration, and has continued during the Obama  administration.  Our FOIA requests (like those of other requesters) have routinely been delayed or lost. Responses have been incomplete, improperly and excessively redacted, and almost always months or years later than the deadlines in the law.

Read More

Aug 30 2013

International travel by air is a Constitutional right

In a preliminary ruling in a lawsuit brought by the ACLU three years ago on behalf of a group of people who have been prevented by the U.S. government from traveling by air, a Federal judge in Oregon has found (1) that international air travel is a Constitutional right, and (2) that a categorical ban by the government on the exercise of that right can only be issued in accordance with due process.

Those shouldn’t be surprising findings. But given that the U.S. government has never sought to follow normal legal procedures by asking a court to issue a no-fly injunction against an individual, and that none of the goverment’s extrajudicial administrative no-fly orders has ever been reviewed on its merits by any court, the latest ruling by District Judge Judge Anna Brown in the case of Latif et al. v. Holder is an important step toward bringing DHS controls on travel within the rule of law.

The ruling is the latest in a series of decisions which have finally begun to uphold the right of travelers to due process and juducial review of the restrictins on their movements. The decison in the Oregon no-fly case echoes similar findings in the past year by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Gulet Mohamed and by the 9th Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District of California in the case of Rahinah Ibrahim.

Read More

Jun 18 2013

Our comments on the TSA’s virtual strip-search machines

Today the Identity Project filed our comments on the TSA’s proposed rules to require travelers to submit to “screening” using virtual strip-search machines (“Advanced Imaging Technology” in TSA-speak.

You have until next Monday, June 24, 2013 to submit your own comments.

Here’s the introductory summary of our comments:

Regulations of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at 49 CFR § 1540.107 currently require would-be air travelers to “submit to screening”, but neither define nor limit the meaning of “submit” or “screening”. Under this NPRM, the TSA proposes to add a new paragraph (d) to § 1540.107, which would authorize the TSA to include “screening technology used to detect concealed anomalies without requiring physical contact with the individual being screened” as part of the “screening” to which would-be passengers must “submit” (those terms remaining otherwise undefined and unlimited).

The proposed rule would require travelers to submit to virtual strip-searches and/or manual groping of their genitals, as a condition of the exercise of their right to travel by air by common carrier.

The Identity Project objects to the proposed rule on the following grounds:

1. The TSA fails to recognize that travel by air by common carrier is a right, not a privilege to be granted or denied by the government or subjected to arbitrary or unjustified conditions. As a condition on the exercise of a right, a requirement to submit to searches or other aspects of “screening” is subject to strict scrutiny. The burden is on the TSA to show that the current and proposed requirements will actually be effective for a permissible purpose within the jurisdiction of the TSA, and that they are the least restrictive alternative that will serve that purpose. The TSA has not attempted to asses the proposed rule according to this standard, and has not met this burden.

2. The TSA errs in claiming that, “Individuals … are not included in the definition of a small entity” in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). Nothing in the statutory definition of “small entities” excludes individuals, and in fact many individual travelers affected by the proposed rule are “small entities” as that term is used in the RFA. The TSA must publish and allow comment on a new RFA analysis that takes into consideration the impact of the proposed rule on individuals in their capacity as “small entities”. If the TSA fails to do so, OMB must disapprove the proposed rule, pursuant to the RFA.

3. In the absence of any definitions of “submit” or “screening”, the current and proposed rules are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Travelers subject to the rules can’t tell what is prohibited or what is required as a condition of travel by air by common carrier, or which actions at TSA checkpoints are and aren’t subject to TSA civil penalties. The rules reach a significant amount of protected conduct by denying the right to travel to a significant number of individuals who pose no threat to aviation.

The proposed rule should be withdrawn, and the practices it would purport to authorize should be suspended. If the proposed rule is not withdrawn by the TSA, it should be rejected by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for failure to include the analysis required by the RFA. The TSA should open a notice-and-comment rulemaking to define “submit” and “screening”, as those terms are used in 49 USC § 44901, 49 CFR § 1540.107, and 49 CFR § 1540.109, with sufficient specificity to enable prospective travelers to know what actions are required and what actions are proscribed.

You can see all 5,000+ comments submitted to the TSA here.

Jun 15 2013

4th Circuit Court of Appeals upholds right to judicial review of no-fly order

In an important victory for judicial review of no-fly orders, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the government’s motion to dismiss the case brought by Gulet Mohamed, overturned the transfer of the case from the District (trial) Court to the Court of Appeals, and sent the case back to the District Court for consideration of the merits of Mr. Mohamed’s complaint.

Gulet Mohamed is truly the poster child for what’s wrong with secret administrative no-fly decision-making. A native-born U.S. citizen of Somali-American ancestry, Mr. Mohamed was placed on  the U.S. “no-fly” list as a teenager, while visiting relatives in Kuwait, as a way to pressure him to become an FBI informer as the only way to get “permission” from the U.S. government to return home to the USA.

When his visa expired, Mr. Mohamed was imprisoned for violation of Kuwaiti immigration law, then tortured by his Kuwaiti captors — at the behest, he plausibly alleges, of the U.S. government.

Kuwait eventually tried to deport Mr. Mohamed back to the U.S., but the U.S. government refused to let him on a flight home, and he was taken back to his cell.

Finally Mr. Mohamed smuggled out a message to his family, and they obtained a lawyer for him in the U.S. He was allowed to return home the day before the U.S. government had been ordered to show cause justifying the denial of Mr. Mohamed’s right of return — after which the government tried to get his case dismissed as moot.

But Mr. Mohamed remains on the no-fly list, so far as he knows (although for unknown reasons). He has continued to pursue his lawsuit against those responsible for his detention and torture and the denial of his right to travel.

As in other cases, the U.S. government has sought to avoid judicial review of the basis for no-fly orders.

The U.S. government has argued that trial courts cannot hear these cases, and that courts of appeals are limited to a review of the TSA’s “administrative record”.  But the TSA doesn’t decide what names to place on the no-fly list. The FBI-controlled Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) makes those decisions, based on “nominations” from itself and various other agencies. A review of the TSA’s “administrative record” would be limited to confirming that the TSA received a no-fly listing from the FBI (as part of the secret Terrorist Screening Database, TSDB), and prevented the person named in that listing from boarding a flight. Nothing in the TSA’s records identified the basis for the TSC’s no-fly designation.

In an unpublished order issued May 28, 2013,  the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals became the second Court of Appeals (following the 9th Circuit’s rulings in the case of Rahinah Ibrahim) to reject the government’s theory. The 4th Circuit ruled that there  was neither sufficient provision for administrative review by the TSA of the no-fly order against Mr. Mohamed, nor a clear indication that Congress intended to preclude District Court trials in cases like this.

The next step, we expect, will be for the government to invoke the “state secrets” doctrine to try to get the case dismissed. But as in Dr. Ibrahim’s case, the fact of Mr. Mohamed having been denied the right to travel and to return to the U.S. can be established without the need to introduce any evidence obtained from the U.S. government.

We look forward to someday seeing a trial on the merits of a U.S. government no-fly order.

May 29 2013

TSA never got OMB approval for “Certification of ID” (Form 415)

In June 2008, the TSA began requiring would-be travelers who didn’t show government-issued ID credentials to fill out and sign — under penalty of perjury — a new “Certification of Identity” form, and answer questions based on the records about them retrieved by a TSA contractor from some commercial data-aggregation company.

Since then, we’ve made a series of FOIA requests to try to obtain the current form, the rules (if any) for its use, and whether the TSA had gotten this collection of information approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).

We’ve recently received a response to one of our FOIA requests, filed more than two years ago, which includes the latest version of TSA Form 415 and makes clear that the TSA has never obtained the requisite OMB approval.

In the absence of OMB approval and a valid OMB control number on TSA Form 415, travelers who decline to respond to these questions or fill  out or sign this form cannot be subjected to any government sanctions, including TSA “civil penalties”.

There are several noteworthy features of the latest documents released by the TSA in response to our FOIA request, particularly TSA Form 415 itself and this email thread regarding how the form is used and whether it requires OMB approval.

First, the e-mail correspondence with the FOIA Office to identify records responsive to our request appears to have been completed within a few weeks. Then the TSA sat on the response for more than two years, presumably while waiting for approval from the DHS FOIA “front office”. From responses to our previous requests, we know that the FOIA “front office” has ordered the TSA not to respond to our requests without this approval, even if responses are complete and otherwise ready to go out.

Second, if the TSA’s latest FOIA response to our request for the “most recent version” is to be believed, the version of the “Certification of Identity” currently in use is this TSA Form 415 dated August 2008.

Third, the TSA never even applied for OMB approval for TSA Form 415 or its unnumbered predecessor “Certification of Identity” form, because the office responsible for obtaining OMB approval was led to believe that the form was to be completed by TSA staff, not by travelers (a manifestly implausible claim, since all versions of the form have included a space labeled for the signature of the would-be traveler).

Fourth, the TSA completely misunderstood the statutory criteria for determining when OMB approval is required. Who fills out the form, or whether there even is a paper form (or information is collected by verbal questioning), is completely irrelevant to the definition in the Paperwork Reduction Act of a “collection of information” for which OMB approval is required:

[T]he term “collection of information” … means the obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an agency, regardless of form or format, calling for … answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on, ten or more persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States….

The consequence is that you aren’t required to complete TSA Form 415 (since it doesn’t have an OMB control number),  you aren’t required to answer any TSA questions (if the same questions are asked of ten or more people), and you can’t be penalized for declining to fill out the form or answer such questions.

May 28 2013

TSA “Glomar” response to request for Terrorist Screening Database records

An individual who used our forms to ask the DHS for its records about their travel  has received response of a sort that we haven’t previously seen to a request of this sort: a “Glomar” response that the DHS will neither confirm nor deny that there are any records about the requester in the DHS mirror copy of the FBI’s “Terrorist Screening Database” (TSDB).

It has long been the policy of the FBI, which is nominally “responsible” for the TSDB, neither to confirm nor deny the existence of TSDB records about any individual.

In 2011, DHS published a notice that it planned to make its own mirror copy, for which it would be responsible, of the FBI’s database. At the same time, the DHS exempted the DHS copy of the TSDB from the Privacy Act.

This is the first DHS response we have seen to a request for records from the DHS copy of the TSDB. It’s no real surprise, but it’s different from the typical DHS responses to requests for records about individuals, which include ignoring requests, producing obviously incomplete responses with no explanation of the missing records, and producing pages and pages of completely blacked-out records.

So the TSA won’t say if you are listed in its copy of the Terrorist Screening Database, but will use it against you if you are.