Sep 12 2012

Secret “watchlist” used as basis for preventive detention

Secret, standardless, extra-judicial administrative “watchlists” of supposed terrorists aren’t just being used to decide who to “watch” — they are now being used as the basis for preventive detention.

A Charlotte, North Carolina man arrested for allegedly driving with a suspended license during the Democratic National Convention had his bail increased to $10,000, cash-only, and spent 36 hours during the convention in jail before getting his bail reduced, on the basis of a police report that gave the basis for detention as, “Known activist + protester who is currently on a terrorist watchlist. Request he be held due to DNC being a National Special Security Event.”

James Ian Tyson told the Charlotte Observer he was shocked to learn that he was on a terrorist watch list. “I haven’t done anything remotely criminal involving politics. No one knows how you get on this list … or the accountability process or, most importantly, how they get off this list….  I am a local Charlottean and an activist and I believe this is an attempt to stifle my First Amendment rights and keep my voice from being heard.”

According to this CNN report and video interview with Tyson and his lawyer, “Tyson … says he has no idea how he wound up on the government’s terrorist watch list. He just wants to save the rain forest. The only dings on his record, at least as far as he knows, consist of fishing for trout out of season and driving while impaired.”

As U. of Miami law professor Michael Froomkin notes,  “[T]his is the first documented example of a non-air-travel-related domestic consequence of being on a ‘terrorist watch list”… I think this small incident is actually a big deal.”

Aug 21 2012

San Antonio public schools plan to make students wear radio tracking beacons

Unless the school board changes its mind, public school students at Jay High School and Jones Middle School in San Antonio, Texas, will be required to wear ID badges containing RFID chips (radio tracking beacons broadcasting unique ID numbers) when they come back to school next week.

Each of these schools has installed an array of “100 or more” RFID readers so that students’ movements can be tracked whenever and wherever they are on school premises. [Update: Interviewed on the Katherine Albrecht radio show, the president of the company supplying the equipment says that the chips have a read range of 70 feet, and that there are readers at least every 100 feet in the schools as well as in school buses.] To make sure students actually carry their RFID badges, they’ll have to use them for all purchases of school lunches as well as for mandatory attendance checks.

This will be one of the first times that anyone in the U.S. who isn’t a prisoner or a government employee or contractor has been compelled by any government agency to carry an RFID chip.

Tonight the elected Board of Trustees of San Antonio’s Northside Independent School District is hearing from students, parents, and other community members opposed to the RFID tracking scheme.

At the same time, a coalition of privacy and civil liberties organizations and experts including the Identity Project has issued a Position Paper on the Use of RFID in Schools calling for a moratorium on the use of the RFID chips for tracking of people. The position paper thus reiterates a point made by many of the same signatories in a 2003 Position Statement on the Use of RFID on Consumer Products. “RFID must not be used to track individuals absent informed and written consent of the data subject,” according to the 2003 statement.

Compulsory tracking by a government agency (a public school district) of the movements of individuals who cannot opt out or withdraw consent, and who are required to be in the school building where RFID readers have been deployed, is a worst-case scenario of how RFID technology shouldn’t be used.

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Aug 02 2012

Police pay $200K to settle lawsuit for illegal roadblock

On December 20, 2002, Terry Bressi was arrested at a roadblock in Arizona being operated by a joint task force including tribal police and agents of the US Department of Homeland Security.

After all of the trumped-up charges brought against Mr. Bressi were dismissed , he sued the tribal police department, the DHS, and the individuals who were responsible for establishing and operating the illegal roadblock for violating his civil rights.

Almost ten years of litigation later, the tribal police defendants have now paid Mr. Bressi $210,000 to reimburse his legal expenses (including some of those related to the work of attorneys associated with the Identity Project and our parent organization, the First Amendment Project) and settle his claims against the police.

The police tried to justify the roadblock as having been solely a sobriety checkpoint, but the police on the scene admitted to Mr. Bressi that they had no reason to doubt his sobriety or suspect him of any other violation of law. He wasn’t an Indian subject to tribal law, and the roadblock was on a state highway and public right-of-way through the reservation.

In reality, as evidence revealed in the course of Mr. Bressi’s lawsuit made clear, the “sobriety check” by tribal police was merely the pretext being used to try to justify the suspicionless search and seizure of innocent travelers, for general Federal law enforcement purposes.

This settlement is far from sufficient to fully compensate Mr. Bressi for the damages he suffered and the years of work he invested in the pursuit of justice for himself and others similarly denied their right to move freely within the U.S., including on public rights-of-way.

The settlement is, however, an important reminder that even police and others acting with and at the behest of the DHS can be held personally liable for their role in violations of travelers’ rights.

We hope that other police officers and civilian DHS collaborators (such as airport checkpoint staff and contractors) will get the message, and start to question illegal orders from the DHS and other Federal agents.

We congratulate Mr. Bressi on obtaining this settlement, and commend him for his diligence in pursuing his case for the last decade.

Jul 26 2012

How to stop Arizona’s SB1070 and similar state ID-check laws

There’s been much concern — and, we suspect, much confusion — about what to do about the portions of Arizona’s SB1070 immigration and ID-check law that weren’t struck down by the US Supreme Court in its decision last month in Arizona v. United States.

The portion of the law that remains in place (at least for now) after the Supreme Court decision is exactly the section that we focused on in our analysis of the law when it was first enacted:

For any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of this state or a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person.

So far as we can tell, the Supreme Court majority (567 U. S. ____, slip opinion at pp. 19-24) reads this section of the law the same way we read it, in three crucial respects:

First, the Supreme Court opinion describes the Arizona law as imposing requirements on state officers to “attempt… to determine” certain facts, in certain circumstances. Nothing in the Supreme Court opinion suggests that SB10170 imposes any obligation on individuals to assist those officers in their “attempt .. to determine” that information, or to carry or provide evidence of, or to answer questions about, their identity or immigration status.

Second, the Supreme Court was unable to find in the text of the law any clear mandate for state officials to detain anyone who would not already be properly subject to detention, or to prolong anyone’s detention, merely in order to facilitate that “attempt … to determine” their immigration status.

Third, the Supreme Court explicltly left open the possibility that any prolongation of detention or delay of release from custody in order to facilitate an immigration check, or as a sanction for inability or unwillingness to supply evidence of identity or immigration status — even if the original detention or custody was lawful — might be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not find that this provision is Constitutional, only that it might be Constitutional — depending on how it is interpreted and applied by Arizona state officers and judges — and that it would be premature to find it unconstitutional just yet:

Some who support the challenge to §2(B) argue that, in practice, state officers will be required to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status…. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. To take one example, a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification. The first sentence of §2(B) instructs officers to make a “reasonable” attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE if there is reasonable suspicion that his presence in the United States is unlawful. The state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry.

To take another example, a person might be held pending release on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. As this goes beyond a mere stop, the arrestee (unlike the jaywalker) would appear to be subject to the categorical requirement in the second sentence of §2(B) that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before [he] is released.” State courts may read this as an instruction to initiate a status check every time someone is arrested, or in some subset of those cases, rather than as a command to hold the person until the check is complete no matter the circumstances. Even if the law is read as an instruction to complete a check while the person is in custody, moreover, it is not clear at this stage and on this record that the verification process would result in prolonged detention. However the law is interpreted, if §2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive pre-emption — at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law….

There is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law…. This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. [slip opinion at pp. 22-24, emphasis added]

This close reading of the law and the Supreme Court opinion makes clear that the next step for opponents of the law is to test how, in practice, the state of Arizona will answer the questions asked by the Supreme Court: Will people in Arizona be detained, will their detentions be prolonged, or will their releases from custody be delayed (without, in each case, some other lawful basis) merely to check their immigration status?

If any of things happen to people in Arizona, the Supreme Court has explicitly left it open for them to bring new Constitutional challenges to those infringements of human rights. And if not, then people in Arizona retain the rights they have always had.

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Apr 25 2012

European Parliament approves PNR agreement with the US. What’s next?

[MEPs picket outside the plenary chamber to ask their colleagues to say “No” to the PNR agreement with the US. (Photo by greensefa, some rights reserved under Creative Commons license, CC BY 2.0)”]

Last week — despite the demonstration shown above (more photos here) by Members of the European Parliament as their colleagues entered the plenary chamber for the vote — the European Parliament acquiesced, reluctantly, to an agreement with the US Department of Homeland Security to allow airlines that do business in the EU to give the DHS access to PNR (Passenger Name Record) data contained in their customers’ reservations for flights to or from the USA. (See our FAQ: Transfers of PNR Data from the European Union to the USA.)

The vote is a setback for civil liberties and the the fundamental right to freedom of movement, in both the US and Europe.

But the vote in the European Parliament is neither the definitive authorization for travel surveillance and control, nor the full grant of retroactive immunity for travel companies that have been violating EU data protection rules, that the DHS and its European allies had hoped for.

Many MEPs voted for the agreement only reluctantly, in the belief (mistaken, we believe), that it was “better than nothing” and represented an attempt to bring the illegal US surveillance of European travelers under some semblance of legal control.

Whatever MEPs intended, the vote in Strasbourg will not put an end to challenges to government access to airline reservations and other travel records, whether in European courts, European legislatures, or — most importantly — through public defiance, noncooperation, and other protests and direct action.

By its own explicit terms, and because it is not a treaty and is not enforceable in US courts, the “executive agreement” on access to PNR data provides no protection for travelers’ rights.

The intent of the US government in negotiating and lobbying for approval of the agreement was not to protect travelers or prevent terrorism, but to provide legal immunity for airlines and other travel companies — both US and European — that have been violating EU laws by transferring PNR data from the EU to countries like the US.  The DHS made this explicit in testimony to Congress in October 2011:

To protect U.S. industry partners from unreasonable lawsuits, as well as to reassure our allies, DHS has entered into these negotiations.

But because of the nature of the PNR data ecosystem and the pathways by which the DHS (and other government agencies and third parties outside the EU) can obtain access to PNR data, the agreement does not provide travel companies with the full immunity they had sought.

Most of the the routine practices of airlines and travel companies in handling PNR data collected in the EU remain in violation of EU data protection law and subject to enforcement action by EU data protection authorities and private lawsuits by travelers against airlines, travel agencies, tour operators, and CRS companies in European courts.

Why is that?

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Mar 07 2012

All US police to get access to international travel records?

This just in from the “All international travelers are suspected terrorists” department:

In response to questions (see the video at approx. 37:00-38:30) from members of a House Homeland Security subcommittee during a hearing yesterday, DHS Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator John Cohen said that, as part of the Orwellianly-named “Secure Communities” program, local police will soon be receiving the result of a check of DHS international travel logs, automatically, for every person arrested anywhere in the US for even a minor offense. Local police will be able to run checks of travel records for “nonoffenders” — innocent people — as well.

According to one report:

Under the forthcoming plan, authorities will be able to instantly pull up an offender’s or nonoffender’s immigration records and biometric markers, he said. The government already is able to vet visitor records from multiple databases for national security and public safety threats, Cohen added.

“So, today, if someone is arrested for any type of offense, part of the query that will take place will be an automatic check of immigrations systems — it will be a check of TECS as well,” he said. “The chances are greatly enhanced that today if somebody were to be booked on a minor drug offense or a serious traffic violation even, the person’s immigration status would come to our attention.”

Here’s what the result of a TECS check might look like: logs of (legal) international travel, and notes from customs inspectors about whatever events they considered noteworthy (again, including events that were entirely legal).  We got these linked examples before DHS exempted TECS from most of the access requirements of the Privacy Act. You no longer have any legal right in the US to find out what’s in the TECS records about yourself. And while TECS was being described to Congress as an immigration enforcement system, these examples are from TECS records about a US citizen. Logs are kept in TECS of everyone who travels to, from, or via the US — even US citizens.

TECS used to include complete airline reservations (Passenger Name Records). PNR data has been re-categorized as a separate DHS system of records, the “Automated Targeting System”. But TECS records include the traveler’s name and the airline code, flight number, and date of each flight, which is sufficient information to retrieve the complete PNR from the airline or the computerized reservation system (CRS) that hosts it. This airline data is obtained from APIS transmissions, which the US has claimed to the European Union are used only for a narrow range of purposes.

Soon, it will be as easy for any local law enforcement officer anywhere in the US to run a “TECS check” of these records about you as it is today for them to run a check of your criminal record from NCIC. Except that the records in TECS are records of your exercise of First Amendment rights of freedom of assembly, not records of criminal convictions.

Or should we be asking if the DHS now thinks that foreign travel has become tantamount to a crime?

Feb 06 2012

State Dept. finalizes passport fee increases, continues to ignore human rights complaints

On February 2, 2012, the State Department published a final rule in the Federal Register setting fees for issuance and renewal of U.S. passports and related consular services.

Contrary to some press reports, this rule didn’t actually increase the current fees. It merely “finalizes” the fee increases that have already been in effect for the last 18 months since the publication of an interim final rule (don’t you love that bureaucratic doublespeak?) in June, 2010.

What’s noteworthy about the “final rule” is that while it purports to include an updated analysis of the public comments on the fee increases, it continues to ignore our complaints that these fees, and the process by which they were adopted, violate both U.S. treaty obligations related to freedom of movement as a human right, and Federal law that requires an assessment of their economic impact on freelancers and other self-employed individuals.

We filed our complaint in the State Department’s designated docket, but also submitted it directly to the Secretary of State with a request that it be forwarded to the State Department’s designated “single point of contact” responsible for insuring that complaints of human rights treaty violations are responded to.

Our complaint of human rights treaty violations isn’t mentioned in the State Department’s analyses of public comments, and we’ve received no acknowledge or response from the Secretary’s office or anyone else at the Department.  Our FOIA request and appeal for records of who the Secretary of State has designated as responsible for responding to such complaints, and what (if anything) they have done with ours, has been pending without even a partial response since July 2011.

Jan 03 2012

The EU-US PNR Agreement — A Legal Analysis of Its Failures

[The following complete article (27 pages) or a summary of the key points (3 pages) can be downloaded in PDF format. Additional analyses and critiques of the proposed EU-US PNR agreement have been published by, among others, the Identity Project, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and a coalition of US and EU NGOs.]

FROM THE DESK OF BARRY STEINHARDT

Chair, Friends of Privacy USA
Bsteinhardt@friendsofprivacy.us
December 26, 2011

Introduction

The proposed agreement regarding Passenger Name Records (PNR) between the United States and the European Union is riddled with faulty assertions and assumptions about US law and the actual operations of the US Government.

These faulty assertions and assumptions go to the heart of the agreement and undercut the claims of protections for European travelers.

As an American lawyer with substantial experience on the PNR and related issues, I want to set the record straight for the European officials who must act on the proposed agreement.

This memo highlights the most serious of those faulty claims and assumptions.

In summary:

  1. The Agreement does not apply to the agency – the Terrorist Screening Center – which actually decides which travelers will be subject to the No Fly rules.
  2. The US Laws cited in the agreement as offering protections to European travelers actually provide very little benefit or are completely irrelevant to the international transfer of PNR data;
  3. Europeans cannot, as the agreement suggests, obtain independent and adequate relief from unlawful actions by the US Executive Branch (USG) by appealing those decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA).There are virtually insurmountable substantive and procedural hurdles to the use of the APA in “appealing” decisions of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).Of greatest importance, most of the relevant actions taken pursuant to the agreement will not qualify as a “Final Order” that can be appealed under the APA;
  4. Beyond that the APA is of little use to travelers who want to challenge the centrally important actions taken by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ).The Agreement is focused on the TSA’s screening of air passengers. It gives short shrift to and offers very little protection from the Automated Targeting System (ATS) operated by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) which is a wholly separate branch of DHS.It is CBP – not the TSA – that use the ATS to decide how Europeans will be treated when they enter exit the US;
  5. There are substantial uncertainties about which, if any, court would be empowered to hear an “appeal” and which agencies would need to be sued. Complex jurisdictional rules regarding APA appeals and transportation security issues throw air passengers into a procedural thicket from which they may never escape;
  6. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer has neither the independence nor the authority claimed in the Agreement. Nor does the CPO of the Justice Department whose jurisdiction includes the TSC, and;
  7. The Agreement does not cover the USG’s uses of private commercial data e.g. data obtained from the Computer Reservation Services (CRS) and the USG has wide power under the Patriot Act and related law to obtain data them.

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Dec 05 2011

Open letter to Members of the European Parliament on EU-US PNR agreement

The Identity Project joins 20 other nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations from Europe and the USA in a joint letter being sent today to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to inform them about the real facts of the proposed EU-US agreement on U.S. DHS access to PNR (travel reservation) data from the EU, and to ask that MEPs reject the proposed and highly controversial agreement.

Press release: Concerned NGOs send letter to inform Members of the European Parliament about the EU-USA Agreement on Passenger Name Records.

German version of press release: VIBE!AT und NoPNR.org senden offenen Brief an EU Parlamentarier um sie über das Fluggastdatenabkommen mit den USA zu informieren.

Text of letter (letter in PDF format):

Information on the upcoming vote on the EU-USA PNR Agreement

Dear MEP,

Soon you will be deciding on the EU-US agreement on passenger name records (PNR).

Since there is confusing information on this agreement, there are a few things we would like to clarify.

Please consider the following issues for your decision on the EU-US PNR Agreement:

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Dec 02 2011

DHS “Automated Targeting System” records

The “Automated Targeting System” (ATS) has been a topic of discussion this week at the Securing Our Rights in the Information-Sharing Era conference on national security, surveillance, and immigration enforcement.

ATS is operated by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component of DHS, although ATS apparently contains links to records held by other agencies and other commercial databases. ATS records include passenger name records (travel reservations), border crossing logs, secondary inspection notes, “risk assessments” of all travelers (even if you aren’t on any watch list), risk assessment algorithms, and pointers to other databases.

Public notice of the existence of ATS was first provided in 2006, but ATS records provided in response to individual requests show that it had already been in operation, illegally, for years before that. If you’ve been on an international airline flight to or from the U.S. in the last ten years, or crossed the U.S. land border in the last few years, CBP has an ATS file of information about you and your travels. There might be ATS records of earlier trips, although older ATS records are spottier. Some ATS files include border crossings and international flights from as far back as the early 1990s.

We’ve posted forms you can use to request your own ATS file from CBP, as well as examples of some of the types of data included in responses to requests for ATS records. (There’s more about what we’ve found in ATS records in this front-page story from 2007 in the Washington Post.) Contact us if you want help with requests or administrative appeals, or in interpreting responses.

If you think there’s any chance you might be on a watch list, you should also send a separate request to the DHS Chief Privacy and FOIA Officer for records from the DHS /ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)  System of Records.  Be sure to state that your request is made under both the Privacy Act and FOIA, and include a request for an accounting of all disclosures of records about you.

The first panelist at the conference was Julia Shearson, a native-born U.S. citizen who was arrested when she tried to drive back into the U.S. after an innocent weekend trip to Canada, on the basis of an entry in ATS falsely flagging her as an “armed and dangerous terrorist”. She’s suing DHS under the Privacy Act to find out why they labeled her a terrorist. Her lawsuit is still pending on remand after a favorable Circuit Court ruling reinstating her complaint. We last reported on her case here; there’s more about her story in this video which was shown yesterday at the conference, and this article from the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Whether the Privacy act provides for recovery of emotional damages was the subject of oral argument before the Supreme Court earlier this week in FAA v. Cooper.

Also still pending is our Privacy Act and FOIA lawsuit against CBP on behalf of Identity Project consultant Edward Hasbrouck, who is seeking ATS records about himself (including his “risk assessments” and the rules used for determining those risk assessments), an accounting of disclosures of those records to other agencies or third parties, information about how ATS records are indexed and retrieved, and records of the processing of his initial requests for ATS records. (He received only incomplete and redacted responses, and not until three years after his initial request and three weeks after he filed suit against CBP for its failure to respond or provide the requested records). A hearing on motions for summary judgment was held in September, and a decision is pending.

Other previous lawsuits related to ATS are discussed here. We’ve also filed comments on CBP rulemakings, objecting to ATS as in violation of the Privacy Act and international human rights treaties.

[On a separate note, the ongoing prosecution of Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which was also mentioned at the conference, is discussed here.]