May 03 2009

EU Council renews push for government access to PNR data

The Council of the European Union has put forward its new version of the “Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes” originally made by the European Commission. (More background on the proposal is available from Statewatch.)

The latest Council version of the proposal is essentially the same as the original Commision proposal, with only trivial changes in repsonse to input from Council members.  Like the original version introduced by the European Commission, the new Council version of the PNR proposal would require each member state to establish a new surveillance agency (a government “Passenger Information Unit” or PIU), and would require each airline operating flights to, from, or within the EU to make PNR data available to the PIU of each origin or destination state.

The Council appears to have entirely ignored the criticisms raised by the European Parliament in its consideration of the PNR proposal, as detailed in its most recent November 2008 resolution withholding Europarl approval. As the Europarl rapporteur said in the plenary session preceeding the vote:

I think the European Parliament is a serious partner, fully available to give input in this process. However, we will only issue a formal position once there are full, satisfactory and detailed answers to all the concerns and objections that were raised on several occasions by the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor, the national data protection authorities, the fundamental rights agencies and the airlines, because I think they are entitled to a real answer.

The latest Europarl vote in favor of this resolution (and against approval of the PNR proposal) was overwhelming: 512 to 5, with 19 abstentions.  Under the “codecision” procedure, Europarl approval is required in order for the PNR proposal to be adopted.  But neither the Commission nor the Council have responded in any meaningful way to their critics, or provided any evidence that any benefit of the PNR scheme would be proportionate to the grave damage it would do to funadamental freedoms.

Europeans should encourage their MEPs to continue to demand answers before they approve any scheme with such profound implications for justice and civil liberties, and not to allow the EU to repeat the mistakes made by the U.S. in establishing PNR-based systems of travel surveillance and control.

Mar 18 2009

NPR parrots the government line on RFID passports

Today’s edition of “All Things Considered” includes a puff piece on e-passports with embedded RFID chips, based entirely on propaganda statements by government spokespeople.  For the other side of the story that NPR didn’t bother to cover, see the listener comments in NPRs blog, our previous articles on RFID chips in government-issued identity documents, and reports elsewhere on how RFID passports facilitate ID theft, how the globally unique ID numbers on the RFID chips facilitate surveillance, how the encryption used for the rest of the data on the RFID chip has already been cracked, and how space has already been reserved in the data structure on the chip for logs of travelers’ movements.

Mar 10 2009

DHS considering hackable long-range RFID as “alternative” to REAL-ID

Chris Strohm of the National Journal’s CongressDaily reports:

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, a former governor of Arizona, said Monday that her office is participating in a working group established by the National Governors Association to review the so-called Real ID law, which Congress passed in 2005 while under Republican control.

“What they’re looking at is whether statutory changes need to be made to Real ID,” Napolitano said after a speech to Homeland Security employees marking the sixth anniversary of the department’s creation.

“They are looking at whether some version of an enhanced driver’s license that perhaps creates options for states would be feasible. They’re looking at what the fiscal impact would be particularly given that states have no money right now,” she added.

“I would expect that over the course of the spring we’ll be rolling something out,” she said.

So-called “enhanced” drivers licenses, already being issued in Washington and Vermont, contain a remotely-readable long-range (“vicinity”) RFID chip, in violation of ICAO international standards for only shorter-range RFID chips in travel documents, with a globally unique identification number to permit anyone within range to track the card or the movements of the person carrying it.  Hackers have already demonstrated, in on-camera real-world tests on the streets of San Francisco, that these enhanced drivers licences and the passport cards that use the same type of RFID chips have succeeded in their design goal of being readable from inside or outside a moving car as it passes by.

This is no “solution” to the problems of the REAL-ID Act, and no improvement.

As we’ve argued in our proposals to the administration and Congress, the only solution to REAL-ID is repeal.  Until Congress takes that essential action, states and citizens should continue their refusal to comply with REAL-ID.

Feb 20 2009

“Homeland Security USA” shows how to travel without ID

The new “reality” television show Homeland Security USA has prompted a Facebook group calling for it to be taken off the air, and protests against its bigotry outside the ABC-TV / Walt Disney Corp. offices in Burbank, even while ratings and viewership have been falling steadily since the first episode.

This week, though, the show gave us a useful lesson: how to fly (within the U.S.) without showing ID.

You can watch Benjamin fly without showing ID in the first half of Episode 5 here on the ABC.com website. (The player won’t work unless it thinks you are running Windows XP or Vista, but it’s possible — sometimes — to get it to work in Linux by using the Windows version of Firefox in the “wine” environment.) Read More

Feb 11 2009

ID checks and government logs of hotel guests

Demands for ID credentials from hotel guests are once again in the public eye, with commenters in travel journalist Christopher Elliott’s blog weighing in with opinions on his recent article about an Orlando hotel, Hotel shows customer the door after he refuses to show ID — can it do that?

This sort of thing doesn’t happen only in the land of Disney World, though. Coincidentally, one of the final public acts of the outgoing Chief Privacy Officer of the DHS last month was to release a lengthy analysis of European laws and practices for requiring hotel guests to identify themselves, and for government access to those records: Interim Report on the EU Approach to the Commercial Collection of Personal Data for Security Purposes: The Special Case of Hotel Guest Registration Data. Read More

Feb 09 2009

Exit permits, ESTA, APIS, and asylum seekers

According to a recently-released European Commission staff working document, the U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) is not “tantamount to the … visa … process” required for admission to the European “Schengen Zone”, and therefore does not give cause for the imposition of reciprocal visa requirements for US citizens seeking to enter Schengen countries.

That’s may be correct. But the EC appears to have asked the wrong question: the ESTA is not an entry permit but an exit permit scheme — which is a much more fundamental violation of human rights, U.S. treaty obligations, and the sovereignty of European and other countries from which people might wish to travel to the U.S.

The same is true of other U.S. travel control schemes (including the APIS and Secure Flight regulations), the proposed European PNR regulations, and the “carrier responsibility” rules in both the U.S. and the E.U.  Regardless of whether it is referred to as “travel authorization”, “pre-departure clearance”, or “permission to transport”, the only meaningful way to construe a “travel authorization” that isn’t an entry visa is as a de facto exit visa. Read More

Feb 03 2009

Drive-by reader for RFID drivers licenses and passport cards

Hacker and researcher Chris Paget has demonstrated the ability to read the globally unique serial numbers on RFID chips in passport cards and electronic drivers licenses in the purses and pockets of pedestians on the street from a passing car, at least 30 feet (9 m) away, and to make cloned copies that broadcast the same ID numbers, using a laptop computer and commercial surplus hardware bought on eBay for $250.

Read More

Jan 15 2009

Recent developments in the USA in travel data

(Comments of the Identity Project at a workshop on “What’s on the agenda in the USA and Canada?” at the annual conference on Computers, Privacy, and Data Protection, Brussels, 16-17 January 2009)

Two major issues have emerged in the last year in relation to personal data about travel: (1) The overall goal of the government of the USA in its various policy initiatives on “travel security” has become increasingly clear. The USA is seeking to establish a global norm that:

  1. Government-issued identity credentials should be required for all forms of travel, domestic and international.
  2. All travel transactions should be recorded in a lifetime “travel history”.
  3. Pre-departure government permission should be required for all travel (based on the identity credential and the associated historical dossier), particularly for air travel or international travel.

Read More

Dec 18 2008

Maryland Seeks to Change License Policy on Immigration In Order to Implement REAL ID System

Maryland’s governor and transportation secretary have announced that they will seek legislation to change the state’s long-standing policy on driver’s license registration and require proof of legal residence before issuing the cards to state residents. Maryland is hoping to make this change as it begins implementing the federal REAL ID national identification system. The governor had rejected a previous proposal for a two-tier system that would have allowed the issuance of a lower-tier license to individuals unwilling to show such proof.

According to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Association’s site, REAL ID implementation means that. “Effective January 1, 2010, individuals applying for a new license will be required to show documentation to prove that they are in the United States legally.” Driver’s license applicants will have to show “Documents such as Social Security Card, U.S. Birth Certificate, U.S. Naturalization of Citizenship, Valid U.S. Passport, Valid Foreign Passport with Visa, U.S. Permanent Residency Card” or other documents to prove their legal presence in the United States.

We have previously detailed the many privacy and security problems that arise from requiring such documentation for a state driver’s license, but let’s focus on the immigration issue that Maryland is attempting to address. Read More

Dec 02 2008

As DHS Secretary, Napolitano Should Halt REAL ID System

The New York Times has a story today about Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano’s nomination as Obama’s Secretary of Homeland Security. The story states that in this new position, Napolitano would have to lead the REAL ID program, a national identification scheme that DHS is attempting to foist on the states. As governor of Arizona, Napolitano signed legislation to join 10 other states in rejecting this national ID program.

The substantial civil liberty problems inherent in this scheme to create a national database of the country’s driver’s license and state ID cardholders won’t disappear if Napolitano replaces Michael Chertoff as the head of DHS. Napolitano should stick to her beliefs and reject this system. As governor, Napolitano focused on the high cost of implementing this national ID system to the states, and these costs will remain substantial if the new administration implements the system created under Chertoff.

In The Identity Project’s recommendations to the Obama transition team, we urged the repeal of REAL ID. Besides the civil liberty problems, REAL ID also has security problems. Those of us who have been following the REAL ID issue, as well as other identification-based security programs, know that there is no sure way for an individual to prove his or her identity based merely on documents that can be easily forged. Therefore, REAL ID would create a system that people would trust even though they shouldn’t — because criminals and terrorists can spend the time and money necessary to forge these “trusted” ID cards.

REAL ID is a fundamentally flawed national ID system for which there is no fix. It must be repealed, and Napolitano should halt the implementation when she takes office.