Edward Hasbrouck – Page 83

Jan 26 2008

Closing the noose on the USA

A pop quiz for US citizens:

The next time you want to leave the USA. will your government let you go? When you want to come back, will they allow you to come home?

Unless people assert their rights, maybe not. And you’ll need the government to give you papers or permission to do so.

The Department of Homeland Security has already issued regulations effective February 18th that will forbid international airlines from letting anyone on a plane to or from the US without individualized express prior permission from the DHS. Those rules were issued in spite of our objections that they violate the US Constitution international human rights treaties.

And already the Department of Homeland Security is trying to enforce an illegal regulation that purports to require passports (issued at the “discretion” and for the “convenience” of the government, not as a matter of right, and which take weeks to obtain if you want to travel on short notice) for citizens to fly between the USA and Canada or Mexico. (Again, having ignored our objections.)

The DHS has proposed to extend that rule to those crossing the land borders with Canada and Mexico, closing the last possible means of leaving the USA, or returning home from abroad, without DHS papers or permission.

Now, without even considering our objections or any others, the DHS has announced a change in “internal” procedures that would achieve essentially the same result as the “pending” rulemaking: Effective January 31st, the goons from the DHS Customs and Border Protection division will be instructed not to permit anyone to cross the US border — even US citizens — unless they present government-issued documents proving their citizenship to their satisfaction.

The burden will be on you to “prove” your right to travel, rather than on the government to prove you are doing something wrong if they want to prevent you. And only government-issued documents will suffice. If the government won’t give you papers, you can neither leave nor return to your own country.

Sep 16 2007

Tell the Feds what you think of their plans

The Transportation Security Administration will hold a public hearing in Washington, DC, this Thursday morning, September 20, 2007 on the TSA’s so-called Secure Flight scheme to require government-issued travel credentials and individualized, explicit, prior permission for all domestic airline travelers within the U.S., and to subject us to government-compelled search and interrogation by private commercial third parties whenever we fly.

The hearing is open to the public, and you can sign up to speak on site with the TSA staff beginning at 8:00 a.m. Thursday at the Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street, N.W. (2 blocks from Metro Center station).

The Identity Project will be there to give our comments in person. We are also submitting detailed written comments on what’s wrong with this scheme. If you can make it, we encourage you to come out too, and tell the TSA what you think of their plans.

If you can’t make it to the hearing, you can submit comments to the TSA online. You can submit comments anonymously, and you don’t have to be a U.S. citizen or resident

Sep 06 2007

Identity Project responds to proposals for restrictions on travel

Continuing our work to expose governments’ efforts to control our movements through checkpoints, government records of where we go and what we do, government-issued credentials and travel documents, and other schemes to require, “Your papers, please!”, the Identity Project has filed formal
comments recently with the Department of Fatherland Security on its latest schemes
to monitor and control our travels:

Comments of the Identity Project on proposed exemptions from the Privacy Act for secret derogatory information from airlines and travel companes stored in personal travel histories (along with records of activities protected by the First Amendment) and used against would-be travelers as part of the “Automated Targeting System”: comments, background
Comments of the Identity Project on proposed requirements for passports or other government-issued credentials for all travel across U.S. borders, including land travel to and from Canada and travel by U.S. citizens seeking to leave, or return to, the U.S., as part of the “Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative”: comments, background

Aug 12 2007

DHS proposes to require both ID papers and passes for all air travel

In a series of recent publications in the Federal Register, the Department of Homeland Security is proposing a comprehensive new system of surveillance and, perhaps more important, control of both domestic and international travelers.

The proposed new rules, which are currently open for public comments, would require that:

All would-be international travellers to or from the USA (even US citizens crossing the U.S.-Canada border on foot) would have to have government-issued ID credentials
All would-be passengers on international or domestic flights to, from, over, via, or within the U.S. would have to have both government-issued ID credentials and explicit case-by-case prior permission from the DHS to the airline to allow each passenger to board a plane.

The proposed rules would enforce the requirements for papers and permits through default provisions that would:

Require all air travellers to show their papers (“government-issued photo ID”) to airline staff on request of the DHS, under penalty of denial of transportation.
Forbid any airline from issuing a boarding pass to anyone, or allowing them to baord a plane, unless and until the airline received individual permission (a “cleared message”) authorizing that airline to allow that specific person on that specific flight.

The “Notices of Proposed Rulemaking” (NPRM) and Privacy (invasion) Act “System of Records Notices (SORNs) dismiss the right ot travel out of hand, and ignore provisions of international law, the Bill of Rights, and Federal law recognizing a right to free domestic and international movement and a “public right of transit” by air, requiring airlines to operate as “common carriers” and transport all passengers paying the fare in their published tariff, and requiring the DHS itself to condider these rights in its rulemaking.

If you haven’t gotten the proper papers, you won’t be allowed even to leave the country, much less to return home. If the government doesn’t choose to give the airline permission for any particular trip you want to take, you won’t be allowed to get on a plane. And any time any airline employee or agent says, “Papers, please!”, you’ll have to produce them for their private inspection, copying, and use for whatever purposes they want.
Among other problems, this amounts to a general order subjecting travelers to private searches, and allowing the private searchers to use any information obtained from those searches for their own commercial or other purposes. Since it is impossible to tell who is, and who is not, actually authorized to act on behalf of the government or to whom an airline has delegated its work, the proposed rules would effectively subject travelers to compulsory search by anyone in any airport claiming (unverifiably) to be an agent of an airline.

May 17 2007

What’s the risk of a national ID card?

Some people don’t understand why we oppose a national ID card. “It’s just a piece of paper,” they say. “What does it matter?”

Historian and law professor Eric Muller of the University of North Carolina has been trying to find out exactly what happened to his great-uncle Leopold Muller, who was deported from his home in Germany in 1942 and never heard from again by those of his family who survived. Most likely, he was eventually murdered at the death camp called Belzec.

Recently, in the course of his research, Eric found his Uncle Leopold’s German national ID card. He also found his Uncle Leopold’s medals for his service in the German army in World War I, during which he lost the use of one arm. But his Kemmkarte identified him boldly on the cover as Jew, not a decorated war veteran. Perhaps that’s why he arrived at the “evacuation” center without his ID card:

The Jew Leopold Israel Müller … will be evacuated to the East on April 25, 1942. He alleges that on April 24, 1942, he lost the kennkarte that he formerly had in his possession…. Müller is therefore without identification papers.

Was the ID card “just a piece of paper” to the Nazis? Was it sufficient that they had the person they wanted in their custody, and would soon send him to his death? No. They immedietely sent the police to search his empty house, find his kennkarte, and dutifully forward it after him (although by the time it arrived, he had been sent on, presumably to his death). The card itself mattered. To “lose” the card was, perhaps, to escape the fatal consequences of the definition it imposed.

Eric tells the story much more eloquently than we could. But what we think is noteworthy in contemporary context is the importance the national ID card played in defining the individual, and involuntarily binding the actual person to the designation (in his case, “Jew”) and categorization imposed on him by the government.

We are people, entitled to define (and redefine) ourselves. We are not, and we should not be, “identified” solely by which pigeon-hole(s) a government decides to put us in.

May 17 2007

GAO confirms IDP complaints that ATS was a crime

Auditors from the Government Accountability Office who reviewed the “Automated Targeting System” (who’s a target? anyone who travels) concluded that the DHS Customs and Burder Protection division “has not fully disclosed or assessed the privacy impacts of its use of personal information during international passenger prescreening as required by law.”

CBP has published public notices and reports that describe certain elements of its international prescreening process, but these documents do not fully or accurately describe CBP’s use of personal data throughout the passenger prescreening process. It is important for CBP’s documentation to describe all of the steps of the prescreening process because the interrelationship of various steps of the process allows data to be transferred and used in ways that have not been fully disclosed.

CBP’s international prescreening process involves a wide range of procedures and data sources that CBP utilizes to determine passenger risk levels. According to a CBP official, to help make these prescreening decisions, CBP collects personal data from multiple sources (including passengers and government databases), and uses the data for several purposes, including identity matching against the government watch list, risk targeting, and passenger document validation. According to CBP, its officers also use commercial data, to a limited degree, to assist them in confirming a passenger’s identity when needed. CBP’s public disclosures about APIS and ATS do not describe all of the data inputs or the extent to which the data are combined and used in making prescreening decisions.

That’s one of the specific complaint the Identity Project made in our original and supplementary comments to the DHS in response to its (late and legally inadequate) notices about the targeting system. The GAO report on airline passenger “screening” was submitted to Congress, and to the DHS, in November 2006, but a censored (“redacted”) version wasn’t made public until this week.

As we pointed out in our comments, it’s a crime under the Privacy Act for a Federal official to operate a system of records — to keep dossiers on U.S. citizens or residents — without legal authority and proper notice. Now the government’s own auditors have confirmed that those running this system to target travelers are, indeed, criminals.

Are the DHS’s “Privacy Officers” capable of policing their own colleagues’ criminal violations of the Privacy Act? If not, will anyone else step in to hold them accountable? Or will the public have to take matters into our own hands, by refusing to comply with unlawful, unconstitutional demands to surrender our human rights and freedom of movement?

Apr 27 2007

Comments on European regulations for reservation systems

The European Commission is considering whether to revise or repeal its regulations governing Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS’s), including the provisions of those regulations protecting the privacy of personal information in airline reservations.

The Identity Project has filed comments with the Commission, urging that these privacy provisions be retained, strengthened, and enforced — not weakened or repealed.

Feb 12 2007

Identity Project unwelcome in Washington

Travel expert, author, and Identity Project consultant Edward Hasbrouck was expelled from the World Research Group, Inc. “Aviation Security Summit” conference — to which he had been specifically invited, as an author, and for which he had registered, paid in full, and been confirmed and signed in as an author — this morning in Alexandria, Virginia. A Wired News reporter, who has been promised a press pass, was also turned away when they arrived. [More from Wired’s 27B Stroke 6 blog, including an audio file of the voicemaail message promising their correspondent admission, here and here] According to conference organizer Pamela Masselli, one of the speakers was unwilling to give their prepared presentation with an author in the audience.

There are many objectionable aspects to this story. But let’s just think about what it says about airport security and the people managing it, assuming the claims about the reasons for Mr. Hasbrouck’s expulsion are true:

An airport security director was on the verge of giving a talk, containing sensitive information that it would be dangerous to make public, in a publicly advertised open forum to which the press had been invited and encouraged to attend. This would seem to be prima facie evidence of gross negligence in their handling of such sensitive information, and in failing to verify, before preparing a “sensitive” presentation, that the venue would be a secure one and the audience properly “cleared” to receive such information. Don’t hold your breath, though, for them to lose their security clearance, or their high-level security management job, for this negligence.

Then they proposed as a “solution” Mr. Hasbrouck’s eviction — thereby indicating, presumably, that they intended to proceed with the same “sensitive” presentation in a venue and before an audience that has still been neither secured nor “cleared” to receive it.

Mr. Hasbrouck registered in his own name, and truthfully volunteered his actual profession. But no attempt was made to check ID or verify who registrants actually were, Anyone remaining in the room after Mr. Hasbrouck was shown the door could have been — well, anyone. Presumably, if there were would-be terrorists in attendance, they wouldn’t have registered as journalists (or as terrorists), but in either fictitious or stolen identities.

Whoever saw throwing out the one known author as a way to “secure” the roomful of other entirely unknown people thereby proved themselves enthralled by a security fallacy, and grossly incompetent as a security professional. Sadly, that same fallacy is at the root of most of the demands for credentials and information about travellers. These measures, described at the start of the conference in words attributed to Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff as “keeping bad people out of the country and off airplanes”, are premised on the false assumptions (1) that there exists a complete and accurate list of all the “bad people” in the world, and (2) that such people, when they want to “do bad things”, will use their own identities rather than fictitious or stolen identities.

Perhaps, in expelling Mr. Hasbrouck, the airport security authorities revealed more about themselves and their (in)competence than they would have if they had let him stay.

Jan 23 2007

New passport rules frustrate last-minute travelers

Effective today, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requires passports for all air travel between the U.S., Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America.

Today the New York Times reports on the problems the new rule has caused for would-be last-minute travellers from the U.S., especially business travellers, who find out they need to travel too late to obtain a passport by mail, and thus have to apply in person at a U.S. State Department Passport Office or through a commercial passport and visa expediting service. The numbers of last-minute applicants have exceeded the capacity of the Passport service, frsutrating travellers and causing some of them to lose potential business.

This is exactly what the Identity Project predicted in comments filed with the DHS and the State Department when these new WHTI rules were proposed last year.

In its assessment of the cost burden of the proposed rules, the DHS and the State Department considered only regular passport applications (supposedly six to eight weeks processing time, although we recently heard from someone who received their passport more than five months after they applied) and expedited two-week service by mail. They made no mention of what happens when a psasport is needed in less than two weeks.

In our comments, we pointed out this omission, and gave a detailed breakdown of the escalating costs of obtaining a passport more quickly, as well as of the consequential costs of trips that would be impossible becaase a passport couldn’t be obtained quickly enough.

The DHS dismissed our comments out of hand, in a response to comments published in the _Federal Register_ in November along with the final rule that goes into effect today:

Comment

One commenter argued that the cost to obtain a passport is significantly underestimated because the time estimated to obtain a passport is too low.

Response

We appreciate this comment and the detail that accompanied the estimate provided in the comment. However, the commenter presented an estimate that was overly pessimistic and represented an absolute ‘‘worst-case’’ scenario that would rarely, if ever, be realized.

The final WHTI cost assessment continued to ignore any of the implications of passports applied for in person or needed in less than two weeks.

As today’s story in the Times shows, the “worst-case scenario” we predicted has already been realized, even before the new rules have taken effect.

It’s time to end the DHS’s extra-judicial and unconstitutional interference with internationally recognized human rights to freedom of travel.

Dec 29 2006

More illegalities in the “Automated Targeting System”

Even while trying to defend the Automated Targeting System that is being used to deny travelers their rights on the basis of secret “risk assessments” that give each of us a terror score from secret databases of third-party and government information about us, the Department of Homeland Security has admitted to more and more violations of Federal laws, the U.S. Constitution, and international human rights treaties.

Today the Identity Project filed supplemental comments with the DHS, pointing out the additional legal problems — including criminal violations of the Privacy Act by DHS officials — revealed by DHS statements since we filed our initial comments on the ATS scheme and how it violates an explicit Congressional prohibition on assigning risk to airline passengers whose names aren’t on government watch lists.

We don’t expect the DHS, especially its Privacy (invasion) Ofiice, to police itself. Keep asking questions and demand answers and action from Congress and European Union officials. If you are in the EU, request your travel records so that we can find out what has really been happening, and how they have really been used.

Papers, Please!

The Identity Project