May 14 2009

“Warden’s skills a plus for TSA chief”

Has it ever seemed like the TSA treats passengers the way prison guards treat convicts?  Here’s what the TSA thinks it takes to run their operations at the world’s busiest airport:

Warden’s skills a plus for TSA chief

Newly appointed Byrd has a background in corrections.

By Kelly Yamanouchi, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Thursday, May 14, 2009)

Mary Leftridge Byrd sees some similarities between her career in corrections and her new job as head of the Transportation Security Administration at the Atlanta airport….

Byrd, 60, joined the TSA last month from a position as assistant and deputy secretary at the Washington State Department of Corrections, and she is a former prison warden and superintendent in Pennsylvania and Maryland.

… The TSA has about 900 security officers in Atlanta.

May 03 2009

EU Council renews push for government access to PNR data

The Council of the European Union has put forward its new version of the “Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes” originally made by the European Commission. (More background on the proposal is available from Statewatch.)

The latest Council version of the proposal is essentially the same as the original Commision proposal, with only trivial changes in repsonse to input from Council members.  Like the original version introduced by the European Commission, the new Council version of the PNR proposal would require each member state to establish a new surveillance agency (a government “Passenger Information Unit” or PIU), and would require each airline operating flights to, from, or within the EU to make PNR data available to the PIU of each origin or destination state.

The Council appears to have entirely ignored the criticisms raised by the European Parliament in its consideration of the PNR proposal, as detailed in its most recent November 2008 resolution withholding Europarl approval. As the Europarl rapporteur said in the plenary session preceeding the vote:

I think the European Parliament is a serious partner, fully available to give input in this process. However, we will only issue a formal position once there are full, satisfactory and detailed answers to all the concerns and objections that were raised on several occasions by the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor, the national data protection authorities, the fundamental rights agencies and the airlines, because I think they are entitled to a real answer.

The latest Europarl vote in favor of this resolution (and against approval of the PNR proposal) was overwhelming: 512 to 5, with 19 abstentions.  Under the “codecision” procedure, Europarl approval is required in order for the PNR proposal to be adopted.  But neither the Commission nor the Council have responded in any meaningful way to their critics, or provided any evidence that any benefit of the PNR scheme would be proportionate to the grave damage it would do to funadamental freedoms.

Europeans should encourage their MEPs to continue to demand answers before they approve any scheme with such profound implications for justice and civil liberties, and not to allow the EU to repeat the mistakes made by the U.S. in establishing PNR-based systems of travel surveillance and control.

May 01 2009

“Secure Flight” data formats added to the AIRIMP

Amendments to the ATA/IATA Reservations Interline Message Procedures – Passenger (AIRIMP) take effect today, providing the first industry standard formats that airlines, travel agencies, and computerized reservation systems (CRSs) can use to transmit the additional information about travelers and prospective travelers newly required by the TSA for its Secure Flight airline passenger “screening” (surveillance and control) system.

What does this mean about the status of Secure Flight — especially in light of the TSA press release last month that claimed to “announce … the implementation of the Secure Flight program”?  Has Secure Flight been implemented?  And if it hasn’t been yet, when will it be? Read More

Apr 20 2009

TSA claims new powers of detention, search, and interrogation

Once again as before trying to legislate by press release and blog posting, the TSA has asserted that it has the general law-enforcement authority to detain would-be airline passengers, seize their possessions, and compel them to answer questions — for reasons entirely unrelated to aviation or security, and even when it cannot articulate any probable cause for a belief that any law has been violated.

These new assertions come in response to an incident in which a passenger attempted to bring a locked metal cash box as part of their carry-on baggage on a domestic flight.  Since the box was opaque to x-rays, the TSA staff at the checkpoint at Lambert Airport in St. Louis asked the traveler to open the box so that they could check whether it contained any prohibited or dangerous items, and took him into a private room to do so.

So far, OK. Commenters in the TSA blog, including jewel dealers, point out that many types of valuables must be carried on (because they are exempt from airline liability if placed in checked baggage) and that they don’t want them inspected in public, where other people might learn what they are carrying.

In the back room, the traveler unlocked the box, and the TSA agents verified that it contained only cash (approximately $4,700), checks, and other documents.  No weapons or explosives, and nothing even arguably prohibited, dangerous, contraband, or illegal.  That should have been the end of the screening. Instead of letting the traveler go on through the checkpoint, however, the TSA then called the local police. It’s unclear if the TSA actually detained the traveler or kept custody of his cash box and its contents while waiting for the police, or if he could have left the airport (with or without his money and checks) before the police arrived, but it’s clear that they wouldn’t have allowed him to continue past the checkpoint to his flight.

Once the police arrived, the police and the TSA together informed the traveler that he was under detention and not free to leave, and interrogated the traveler about his employment, the reasons for his trip to St. Louis, the ownership and source of the money and checks (which in fact were the proceeds from a political event, which thus contained information protected by the First Amendment about acts of assembly and association by the writers of the checks), and other issues unquestionably unrelated to weapons, explosives, or aviation security.

The traveler responded to each of these questions, calmly and politely, by asking, “Am I required by law to answer that question?”  None of the TSA staff or police would answer this question, nor have they subsequently done so.  Instead, they told him that possession of cash and failing to answer their questions was “suspicious”, and threatened to keep him under detention and “take him downtown” to be questioned further by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

After about 25 minutes, and after some conversation out of his hearing between the agents and an unidentified person in plain clothes, the traveler was told he was free to go.  He made his plane, with his cash box and its contents.

We know all this because the traveler, Steve Bierfeldt, covertly recorded all but the start of the incident on his iPhone. There’s more about the incident, including interviews with Mr. Bierfeldt, in these reports from Fox News and the Washington Times.  And in case you are wondering, the incident occurred in Missouri, where the law permits any party to a converstion to record it, even without the knowledge or consent of the other party or parties.

But the worst thing isn’t what the TSA did, but what it has subsequently claimed it has the right to do, and to compel would-be travelers to do.  According to the TSA blog: Read More

Apr 20 2009

Secret Secure Flight “vetting” algorithm now in use by 4 US airlines

A TSA press release announces the “implementation” of the Secure Flight system for pre-departure “vetting” of airline passengers (i.e. deciding, according to a secret algorithm, whether to allow them to fly):

To date TSA has assumed the watch list matching responsibility for passengers on domestic commercial flights with four volunteer aircraft operators and will add more carriers in the coming months.

As quoted above, the TSA describes the process for making permission-to-travel decisions and assigning risk scores (“cleared”, “inhibited”, or “not cleared”, corresponding to the scores of “green”, “yellow”, and “red” in the previous CAPPS-II version of the proposal which eventually morphed into Secure Flight) as “watch list matching”.  But the process diagram (included as slide 8 of this presentation to potential Secure Flight contractors) makes clear that the scheme is considerably more complex than simple list matching, with many more inputs and feedback loops.

Procedures and directives for implementation of Secure Flight are contained in secret “Security Directives” issued by the TSA to airlines, secret internal TSA documents including software code, and secret “Aircraft Operator Implementation Plans” submitted by airlines and approved by the TSA.  None of these have been made public.  As a result, it is impossible for travelers or the public to know what we are required to do, under what conditions the TSA will or will not give us permission to fly, and whether any claims about “requirements” made by airlines are true or false.

Read More

Mar 21 2009

DHS releases (censored) documents on Automated Targeting System

As part of its celebration of “Sunshine Week”, The Electronic Frontier Foundation has posted more than a thousand pages of documents about the Automated Targeting System (ATS) for archiving and data-mining airline reservations to asisgn risk scores to all international travelers, released by the Department of Homeland Security over the last two years in response to Freedom of Informaiton Act requests and a FOIA lawsuit by EFF’s FOIA Litigation for Accountable Government (FLAG) project.

DHS claims still to be searching for and “processing” yet more documents responsive to the original requests, the documents that have been released are heavily redacted, and the lawsuit is ongoing.  Recently, EFF has asked the Court hearing the case to stay further proceedings while DHS decisions under the Bush Administration to withhold and redact documents at issue in the case are reviewed in light of the Obama Administration’s new instructions to Federal agencies on transparecncy and the processing of FOIA requests.

We’re still making our way through the newly-published documents for the first time, but they include extensive internal DHS discussion on how to respond to our criticisms, when the DHS first published the official notice (we’re still not exactly sure how many years after the fact) that was supposed to precede the deployment of any such system of Federal records about individuals, that the ATS was being used for a purpose specifically forbidden by Congress.  The documents also seem to confirm, even through the redactions, the lack of understanding by DHS of what information is included in the Passenger Name Records (PNRs) being sucked into government databases by the ATS dragnet, or how to interpret it.  Briefing memos prepared by operational staff for senior policy officials and public relations spokespeople refer to what PNRs “seem” to contain, and appear to be based on guesses and reverse engineering rather than on any expertise in industry standards, messaging protocols (such as the AIRIMP), or business practices.

Mar 18 2009

Air France puts digital fingerprints in RFID boarding passes

Yesterday (just in time for tomorrow’s planned strike by French air traffic controllers, which is expected to force the cancellation of many of their flights), Air France began a public beta test of what they are calling a “smartboarding” card, as depicted in this video (and third-party videos in English and another in French) and photos and as described in this press release:

This new system is a world first. With a personal card which contains the latest biometric technology (encrypted fingerprints), RFID (radio frequency identification) and thermal printing (the back of the card can be reused up to 500 times), these passengers will be able to board through a dedicated portal whenever they choose.

Developed together with Citizengate, the smartboarding® service has 4 stages:

1. In a special office at the airport (Paris-Charles de Gaulle Terminal 2F), customers can obtain their personal smartboarding® card in just a few minutes which is immediately operational. During registration, all the customer’s identity information (surname, first name, Flying Blue membership number), as well as their encrypted fingerprints is transmitted to the smart card. This registration stage is only carried out once and no files are kept by Air France. Read More

Mar 18 2009

NPR parrots the government line on RFID passports

Today’s edition of “All Things Considered” includes a puff piece on e-passports with embedded RFID chips, based entirely on propaganda statements by government spokespeople.  For the other side of the story that NPR didn’t bother to cover, see the listener comments in NPRs blog, our previous articles on RFID chips in government-issued identity documents, and reports elsewhere on how RFID passports facilitate ID theft, how the globally unique ID numbers on the RFID chips facilitate surveillance, how the encryption used for the rest of the data on the RFID chip has already been cracked, and how space has already been reserved in the data structure on the chip for logs of travelers’ movements.

Mar 11 2009

European court invalidates secret carry-on baggage blacklist

In a judgment announced yesterday, the European Court of Justice has ruled that a secret list promulgated by the European Commission, specifying items to be prohibited from airline carry-on baggage, cannot be enforced against individual airline passengers because it was not made public:

The annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 of 4 April 2003 laying down measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2004 of 15 January 2004, which was not published in the Official Journal of the European Union, has no binding force in so far as it seeks to impose obligations on individuals.

The decison means that the original plaintiff, Gottfried Heinrich, who was ordered off a plane before it departed from Vienna Airport because he had carried on an item on the secret list (to wit, a tennis racket), is now free to sue the airline and/or the airport operator in an Austrian court for damages.

Read More

Mar 10 2009

DHS considering hackable long-range RFID as “alternative” to REAL-ID

Chris Strohm of the National Journal’s CongressDaily reports:

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, a former governor of Arizona, said Monday that her office is participating in a working group established by the National Governors Association to review the so-called Real ID law, which Congress passed in 2005 while under Republican control.

“What they’re looking at is whether statutory changes need to be made to Real ID,” Napolitano said after a speech to Homeland Security employees marking the sixth anniversary of the department’s creation.

“They are looking at whether some version of an enhanced driver’s license that perhaps creates options for states would be feasible. They’re looking at what the fiscal impact would be particularly given that states have no money right now,” she added.

“I would expect that over the course of the spring we’ll be rolling something out,” she said.

So-called “enhanced” drivers licenses, already being issued in Washington and Vermont, contain a remotely-readable long-range (“vicinity”) RFID chip, in violation of ICAO international standards for only shorter-range RFID chips in travel documents, with a globally unique identification number to permit anyone within range to track the card or the movements of the person carrying it.  Hackers have already demonstrated, in on-camera real-world tests on the streets of San Francisco, that these enhanced drivers licences and the passport cards that use the same type of RFID chips have succeeded in their design goal of being readable from inside or outside a moving car as it passes by.

This is no “solution” to the problems of the REAL-ID Act, and no improvement.

As we’ve argued in our proposals to the administration and Congress, the only solution to REAL-ID is repeal.  Until Congress takes that essential action, states and citizens should continue their refusal to comply with REAL-ID.