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15 16	RYON LESLIE ROOT,	No. 8:23-cv-00070-CJC-ADS				
17 18 19	Petitioner/Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,	Hearing Date: Hearing Time: Ctrm: Hon.	August 28, 2023 1:30 p.m. 9 B Cormac J. Carney, United States District Judge			
20 21	Respondent/Defendant.					
22 23 24	 DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. 					
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on August 28, 2023 at 1:30 pm, as soon thereafter as they may be heard, Defendant the U.S. Department of State will, and hereby does, move this Court for an order dismissing the complaint without leave to amend. This motion will be made in the Ronald Reagan Federal Building and Courthouse before the Honorable Cormac Carney, United States District Judge, located at 411 West Fourth Street, Santa Ana, CA 92701.

Defendant brings the motion on the ground that Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus and that his filings fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, as set forth further in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

This motion is made upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and all pleadings, records, and other documents on file with the Court in this action, and upon such oral argument as may be presented at the hearing of this motion.

This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 which was held on July 12, 2023.

1	Dated: July 19, 2023	Respectfully submitted,
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4		Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
5		DIANE KELLEHER
6		Assistant Director
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Federal law authorizes the State Department to reject passport applications that omit the applicant's assigned social security number (SSN). Petitioner here refused to provide his SSN, and the State Department therefore denied his passport application. Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the State Department to reverse its denial and issue him a passport. He contends that the statute authorizing the State Department to deny passport applications that omit the applicant's issued SSN unconstitutionally infringes on his right to privacy; infringes on his right to travel internationally; and is unconstitutionally "overbroad."

The petition for a "writ of mandate" should be denied: The proper vehicle for petitioner's claim is an ordinary civil suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, not a petition for a writ of mandamus. But, in any event, Petitioner has no valid legal claim: the challenged statute advances the government's interests in combatting fraud and tax evasion, among other interests, and easily survives constitutional scrutiny.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

The Secretary of State and his designees are authorized to "grant and issue passports," 22 U.S.C. § 211a, but there are many reasons a passport application might be denied, such as serious tax debt. See 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(e); see also, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 51.60 (identifying several reasons). Particularly relevant here, Congress has provided expressly that the Secretary is "authorized to deny such application" for a passport if the application either "does not include the social security account number issued to that individual" or "includes an incorrect or invalid social security number willfully, intentionally, negligently, or recklessly provided by such individual," 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f); see also 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(f) (same). For applicants who do not have an SSN—such as U.S. citizens born and living abroad who have never needed one—the State Department instructs them to list their SSN as all zeroes; such applicants who genuinely do not have an SSN may still

be issued a passport. See Passport Application at $1 ext{ } ext{ } ext{5}$ ("If you do not have a Social Security number, you must enter zeros in this field and submit a statement").

1. State Department Review of Passport Applications

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The declaration of Paul Peek, attached hereto, sets forth the process by which the State Department reviews passport applications and the role the SSN information plays in that process. See Decl. of Paul Peek (July 19, 2023) (Peek Decl.). As Mr. Peek, who oversees the State Department's passport adjudication system, explains, the State Department has relationships with numerous federal, state, and local agencies that provide information relevant to the issuance of a passport. Peek Decl. ¶ 4 When reviewing passport applications, the Department cross-checks the information provided in the application against other information in its systems, such as flags for tax delinquencies, child support delinquencies, arrest warrants, or national security concerns. Id. In addition, State Department personnel examine applications for indications of fraud or identity theft to ensure proper issuance of passports. Id. ¶¶ 5-8. In these and other efforts, the applicant's SSN, if he or she provides one, serves as an important tool. Unlike other identifying information, SSNs are unique, unchanging, and comparatively confidential. *Id.* ¶¶ 6–7. Other identifying information, like names, for example, may be shared by multiple people, may be changed, and are readily available in public records. Id. ¶ 5. The special characteristics of SSNs make them particularly useful, therefore, in rooting out application fraud or passport ineligibilities. For example, an application that contains the applicant's biographical information such as date and place of birth but omits an SSN may indicate that the person submitting the application does not have access to the SSN—a potential indication of identity theft. *Id.* ¶ 6.

2. 2015 FAST Act Changes to Passport Applications

In 2015, Congress authorized the State Department to require applicants to include their assigned SSN as a condition for issuing a passport. Prior to 2015, federal law required

¹ Available at https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11.pdf.

(and still does) that applicants provide their social security number, but until 2015 the law did not authorize the State Department to deny a passport to applicants who did not comply. Instead, compliance was enforced only by a \$500 fine assessed by the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. § 6039E. Governmental reports had noted that the State Department's inability to deny a passport application that omitted the applicant's SSN specifically hindered tax enforcement efforts. See Potential for Using Passport Issuance to Increase Collection of Unpaid Taxes (Government Accountability Office Report), GAO-11-272 (March 2011). In 2015, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). Pub. L. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (Dec. 4, 2015). As part of that Act, Congress authorized the State Department to deny passport applications when the applicant omits his or her assigned SSN or when the applicant willfully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently includes an incorrect SSN. FAST Act § 32101, 129 Stat. 1729, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2214a(f). Consistent with that law, the State Department has generally denied applications that omit the applicant's assigned SSN since 2016. See Passports, 81 Fed. Reg. 60608-1 (Sep. 2, 2016); Peek Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.

B. Factual Background²

Petitioner Ryon Root applied for and received a passport in 2000/2001 and again in 2010. *See* Pet. 5–6. In each application he omitted his SSN, but the law then in place did not authorize the State Department to deny an application for omitting an SSN. *Id.*; *see* Peek Decl. ¶ 12. When Mr. Root applied again in 2020, the law had changed. In his 2020 application, Mr. Root wrote that his SSN was 000000000 (the application materials

² Mr. Root styles his filing as a petition for a writ of mandate, which the government construes as a complaint, *see* Pet. at 5–9, combined with a separate petition for a writ of mandamus, *see* Pet. at 11–24. The government includes additional factual context here in its response to the petition, but none of that factual background is material to the legal issues raised by either portion Mr. Root's filing. Accordingly, the Court need not resolve disputed facts, if any, to deny the petition or to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. If the Court determines that consideration of extra-pleading material is necessary to resolve the motion, the government respectfully asks that the Court convert this motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(d).

instruct applicants without an SSN to use all zeroes). Peek Decl. ¶ 13. The State Department checked the information in Mr. Root's application against other records and determined that the Social Security Administration had issued an SSN to someone matching his biographical details. *Id.* Because the Department's investigation indicated that, contrary to his application materials, Mr. Root did in fact have an SSN, it wrote to him requesting that he either provide his SSN or declare under penalty of perjury that he had never been issued one; Mr. Root responded by declaring he had never been issued an SSN. *See id.* Based on the State Department's investigation, the Department concluded that Mr. Root did have an SSN and that he had not complied with the statute or regulations; the Department denied his application in early 2021. *See* Pet. at 6; Peek Decl. ¶ 13. Mr. Root applied again for a renewed passport later in 2021, again omitting his SSN. *See* Pet. at 6; Peek Decl. ¶ 14. The State Department again concluded—referencing data provided by the Social Security Administration—that Mr. Root did have an SSN and again denied his application for failing to include his issued SSN. Peek Decl. ¶ 14; *see* Pet. at 6.³

In 2023, Mr. Root then filed what he labeled as a "Petition for a Writ of Mandate," principally seeking a court order requiring the State Department to vacate its denial and issue him a passport. *See* Pet. at 9.

III. ARGUMENT

The Court should dismiss Mr. Root's pleading for failure to state a claim and deny leave to amend as futile.⁴ A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

³ Although Mr. Root's submissions to the State Department indicated he had never been assigned an SSN, *see* Peek Decl. ¶¶ 13−14, Mr. Root's court filings make no such allegation, and his claim to privacy regarding his SSN is inconsistent with his prior assertion to the State Department that he does not have one. In any event, the Court need not resolve whether Mr. Root does or does not have an SSN: he challenges the statute's requirement as unconstitutional, not the State Department's determination that he had not complied with it.

⁴ Although courts have sometimes discussed the merits of a mandamus petition in terms of "jurisdiction" to award mandamus relief, that analysis is best understood as a determination that the petition fails on the merits, not that the court lacked jurisdiction to (footnote cont'd on next page)

when, taking the facts alleged as true, the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief because of "either a 'lack of a cognizable legal theory" or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." *Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., Inc.*, 922 F. Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citation omitted). "[A] Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where a court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility." *All. for Const. Sex Offense L. Inc. v. Dep't of State*, No. CV 18-256-JFW(PLAX), 2018 WL 6011543, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2018) (citing *Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery*, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Petitioner here fails to satisfy any of the three elements necessary to obtain mandamus relief. Repleading his claims under the Administrative Procedure Act would be futile because his legal contentions are mistaken—the FAST Act does not unconstitutionally infringe either his right to privacy or his right to international travel. Because no additional or different factual allegations would change this calculus, leave to amend should be denied. *See, e.g., Primary Color Sys. Corp. v. Hiscox Ins. Co., Inc.*, No. SACV2202029CJCJDEX, 2023 WL 2347386, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2023) (citing *Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris*, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017)).

A. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Mr. Root's claim for mandamus should be denied. Mandamus is an "extraordinary" remedy that will issue only when the petitioner can show that "(1) the plaintiff's claim is clear and certain; (2) the duty of the officer is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available." *Fallini v. Hodel*, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); *see also Plaskett v. Wormuth*, 18 F.4th

assess the merits. *Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) ("Jurisdiction, it has been observed, is a word of many, too many, meanings"). Regardless, the only relevant consequence in this case to labeling the argument as jurisdictional instead of as going to the merits is that a party cannot waive or forfeit jurisdiction. *See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (discussing

significance of distinction). But because the government does actually raise the arguments have it is immeterial whether the issue is preparly labeled "iurisdictional"

here, it is immaterial whether the issue is properly labeled "jurisdictional."

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1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2021) (identifying same elements). Here, Mr. Root's petition fails each element.

First, Mr. Root's claims are far from clear or certain. He contends variously that the statute requiring him to provide his SSN in his passport application (1) unconstitutionally infringes his right to privacy by requiring him to provide a government-issued identification number to a government agency; (2) unconstitutionally infringes his limited constitutional right to travel internationally by unjustifiably requiring him to provide additional identifying information in his passport application; and (3) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it assertedly would "require" all passport applicants "to obtain an SSN, without first establishing a legitimate governmental interest to support such a requirement." See Pet. at 13–23.

As explained in more detail below, see infra Section III.B.2, all these claims lack merit. But to the extent Mr. Root's contentions are even plausible, they are neither clear nor certain. Cf. In re California Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (claim not "clear and certain" when "[i]t is at the very least arguable" that the statute authorized challenged agency action). Mr. Root identifies no case holding, or even suggesting, that the constitutional rights to privacy or to international travel are unduly infringed by the requirement to provide an SSN in a passport application. To the contrary, those courts faced with constitutional challenges to the statute have rejected them. See Walker v. Tillerson, No. 1:17-CV-732, 2018 WL 1187599, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Pompeo, 735 F. App'x 69 (Mem.) (4th Cir. 2018); Whitfield v. U.S. Sec'y of State, 853 F. App'x 327, 330 (11th Cir. 2021) (rejecting procedural due process challenge to statute). And as to his overbreadth argument, Mr. Root misunderstands both the statute—it does not require applicants to obtain an SSN if they do not have one, see 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(1)(A)(i)—and the overbreadth doctrine—which has no application outside the First Amendment context, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Mr. Root has failed to identify any authority to support a clear or certain claim that would justify issuance of an extraordinary writ of mandamus—and relevant authorities in fact undermine his claim.

Second, Mr. Root identifies no clearly circumscribed legal requirement that the State Department issue him a passport. For one, the presumptively valid statute he challenges expressly authorizes the State Department to deny a passport application in these circumstances. See, e.g., Walker, 2018 WL 1187599 at *6 (denying mandamus because statute authorizes Secretary to deny applications that omit the applicant's SSN). For another, even setting aside the statutory requirement to include his SSN, the statute provides that the Secretary "may grant and issue passports," indicating a degree of discretion that Mr. Root has not rebutted. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 n.26 (1981) (recognizing that provision in the Passport Act which states that the Secretary of State "may" issue passports "recognizes substantial discretion"). When agency action is discretionary, rather than mandatory, mandamus is not available. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying mandamus when statute used "may" in contrast to "shall").

Third, Mr. Root has a readily available alternative legal remedy to challenge the allegedly erroneous or unconstitutional denial his passport application: an ordinary civil suit that challenges final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Jafarzadeh v. Duke, 270 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311 (D.D.C. 2017) ("[B]ecause plaintiffs are able to assert the same claim through the APA, they cannot obtain relief under the Mandamus Act[.]"); see also Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 641 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) ("The availability of relief under the Administrative Procedure Act also forecloses a grant of a writ of mandamus."); Mt. Emmons Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the availability of a remedy under the APA "technically precludes" an alternative request for mandamus); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the availability of injunctive relief under the APA means that the "grant of a writ of mandamus would be improper"). The APA allows Mr. Root to seek various forms of relief—including an injunction or declaratory judgment, 5 U.S.C. § 703—if he

can demonstrate that approval of his application was "unlawfully withheld," *id.* § 706(1), or the denial of his application was (among other possibilities) "contrary to constitutional right," *id.* § 706(2)(B). Because this alternative relief is available, resort to the extraordinary writ of mandamus is not. *See, e.g., Vaz v. Neal*, 33 F.4th 1131, 1125 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that relief under the APA typically displaces the need for mandamus relief); *Plaskett*, 18 F.4th at 1082 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2021) (similar).

The Court should therefore deny Mr. Root's petition for a writ of mandamus.

B. The Court should deny leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

Any amendment to Mr. Root's pleadings would be futile, and the Court should therefore deny leave to amend. Mr. Root cannot plead a valid claim under either of the statutory provisions for review under the APA that preclude his mandamus action.

1. Relief under § 706(1) is unavailable.

Relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) is unavailable to Mr. Root for the same reasons that mandamus relief is unavailable. As the Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated, "the showing required to support a request for an order under § 706(1) compelling an agency to take a discrete action mirrors the showing that is required to obtain mandamus-type relief." *Plaskett*, 18 F.4th at 1082. Thus, a court can order relief under § 706(1) "only if there is a specific, unequivocal command placed on the agency to take a discrete agency action," "the agency has failed to take that action," and the action sought is "pursuant to a legal obligation so clearly set forth that it could traditionally have been enforced through a writ of mandamus." *Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Cent. Intel. Agency*, 811 F.3d 1068, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As just illustrated, Mr. Root cannot demonstrate a clear legal duty for the State Department to grant his passport application or that mandamus relief would otherwise be available. Because allowing Mr. Root to cure his failure to plead the APA's statutory equivalent to mandamus relief would be futile and waste party and judicial resources, the Court should not permit him to do so.

2. Relief under § 706(2) is unavailable.

Nor should Mr. Root be granted leave to amend his complaint to seek relief under

5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Although that provision provides the most natural route for the claims he makes—that the State Department's denial of his application violated his constitutional rights for any of three reasons—such claims would fail as a matter of law and need not be countenanced further.

a. The statute does not unconstitutionally infringe Petitioner's right to privacy.

Petitioner's asserted constitutional right to informational privacy does not entitle him to omit his SSN in his passport application.⁵ Here, the statute does not implicate petitioner's privacy interests at all because the information sought is neither private from the government nor will it be publicly used or disclosed. And, in any event, the government's interests in using individuals' SSNs to combat fraud and identify other passport ineligibilities plainly outweigh Mr. Root's interest in withholding his government-issued SSN from the government.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a limited constitutional "right to informational privacy" stemming from 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." *Endy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 975 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *In re Crawford*, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)). This right is narrow and conditional; even where it is implicated the government may still seek and use the information if the government's interests outweigh the individual's interest in withholding the information. *See id.*; *see also NASA v. Nelson*, 562 U.S. 134, 153 (2011) (rejecting argument that government's inquiries must be "necessary" or the "least restrictive means" as directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent). And "[l]egitimate governmental interests combined with protections against public dissemination can foreclose a constitutional violation." *Endy*, 975 F.3d at 768 (citing *NASA*, 562 U.S. at 138).

⁵ Petitioner also points to authority arising in the context of the Freedom of Information Act. *See* Pet. at 14 (citing *Painting Indus. of Hawaii v. Dept. of Air Force*, 26 F.3d 1479, 1482–83 (9th Cir.1994)). But the Ninth Circuit has clearly rejected the value of such authority in the context of a constitutional claim. *See Doe v. Garland*, 17 F.4th 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2021).

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. The Government-issued nature of the SSN, and tight controls on its dissemination, preclude Mr. Root's privacy claim.

The statute at issue here does not implicate or infringe Petitioner's privacy interests at all. The Ninth Circuit has identified two ways for the government to violate the right to informational privacy: by "disclosure to 'third' parties" or by "non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed [personal] information." *Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab'y*, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Neither is alleged here.

Requiring Mr. Root to include his SSN in his submissions to the government does not implicate his privacy interests because it does not disclose information that is not already known to the recipient. The government already knows his SSN—after all, the government issued it to him. Rather, the SSN requirement serves to verify his identity and to allow the State Department to check other systems efficiently and accurately for passport ineligibilities. And as the Ninth Circuit noted in In re Crawford, an SSNalthough often and advisably kept private—is not "inherently sensitive or intimate information, and its disclosure does not lead directly to injury, embarrassment or stigma." 194 F.3d at 960. Rather, the privacy interest in one's SSN relates only to the potential downstream consequences of its misappropriation by bad actors, id.; the Ninth Circuit thus stated only that "public disclosure of SSNs . . . may implicate the constitutional right to informational privacy." Id. at 958 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit accordingly distinguished collecting information from making the information public. See id. at 960 (noting government interests that supported public disclosure differed from those supporting collection); see also id. at 959 (describing issue as "whether the government may properly disclose private information"). Because his SSN is not "previously unrevealed" to the government, his privacy rights are not implicated.

And Petitioner does not allege—nor could he—that the State Department will release or disclose his SSN to the public. *Cf. Endy*, 975 F.3d at 769 ("Endy's constitutional privacy claim fails under both state and federal law because he provides no evidence that his information has been publicly disseminated or disclosed."). The Supreme Court

rejected an informational privacy claim in *Whalen v. Roe* in part because the government was statutorily prohibited from releasing the contested information outside a judicial proceeding, and there had been no evidence that the law restricting further disclosure had been violated. 429 U.S. 589, 600–02 (1977). As noted, the State Department already has access to applicants' SSNs (including Mr. Root's), which is one way it verifies the accuracy of applications and how it matches applications to other data in its systems. *See generally* Peek Decl. ¶¶ 8, 13–14. But there is no evidence or allegation that those SSNs are publicly disclosed: Just as in *Whalen*, existing law generally prohibits the State Department from further disclosing the private information. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (Privacy Act limitations on disclosure). And State Department passport application systems are not accessible to the public; indeed, access is tightly controlled even within the State Department. *See* 8 Foreign Affairs Manual 1203.1-1 (explaining general policy prohibiting disclosure and limiting internal access to passport records). *6 Cf. Roe v. Sherry*, 91 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1996) (no constitutional violation where "officers took steps to protect the confidentiality" of medical information after collecting it).

ii. The Government's interests in collecting SSNs as part of its passport application process outweigh Mr. Root's objections to providing his.

Regardless, whatever minimal interest Petitioner has in withholding his SSN from the government is easily outweighed by the government's competing interests in an efficient and effective passport application system. *Cf. Doe v. Att'y Gen. of U.S.*, 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (indicating that necessary strength of government interest varies with sensitivity of information at stake). As outlined above and discussed in the attached declaration, the government relies on provided SSNs to reduce fraud, verify identity, check applicants for passport ineligibilities, and enforce tax laws. *See* Decl. ¶¶ 6–9; *see also* GAO Report. Given that an SSN is not "inherently sensitive or intimate information, and its disclosure does not lead directly to injury, embarrassment or stigma," the government's

⁶ Available at https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM120301.html#M1203_1_1.

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interest in confirming identity, combatting fraud, and ensuring passports go only to eligible applicants is more than sufficient to justify collection of SSNs, notwithstanding any associated privacy interests. *See In re Crawford*, 194 F.3d at 960 (upholding collection and publication of SSNs to combat fraud and enhance public confidence).

b. The statute does not unconstitutionally infringe Petitioner's right to international travel.

Petitioner's asserted constitutional right to travel internationally is not unconstitutionally infringed by the requirement that he include his SSN in his passport application. Walker, 2018 WL 1187599, at *8 (rejecting identical claim). When assessing a substantive due process claim, a court "must first consider whether the statute in question abridges a fundamental right." United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012). "When reviewing a challenge to a legislative act that does not infringe on a fundamental right, rational basis review applies[.]" Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927, 939 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (similar). The right to international travel is not a fundamental constitutional right, but instead is "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment" that therefore "can be regulated within the bounds of due process." Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 (quoting Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978)); see also Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-CV-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 1446772, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016) ("[W]hile there may be a fundamental right to domestic travel, there is no such fundamental right to international travel."). Requiring a passport applicant to include his or her assigned SSN in the application is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—preventing fraud, screening for passport ineligibilities, and collecting tax revenue—and Mr. Root's contention therefore fails.

"Because international travel is not a fundamental right, limitations on it are evaluated under a rational basis test." *Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 854 F. Supp. 654, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Courts routinely apply rational basis review when assessing restrictions on international travel. *See, e.g., Franklin v. United States*, No. 3:20-CV-1303-

N, 2021 WL 4458377, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2021), *aff'd*, 49 F.4th 429 (5th Cir. 2022) (rejecting constitutional challenge to FAST Act's passport rules); *Maehr v. U.S. Dep't of State*, 5 F.4th 1100, 1122 (2021)⁷; *Clancy v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control*, 559 F.3d 595, 604 (7th Cir. 2009); *Weinstein v. Albright*, 261 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2001) (adopting reasoning of district court applying rational basis, *see Weinstein v. Albright*, No. 00-cv-1193, 2000 WL 1154310, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000)). Courts in this circuit—consistent with the lead opinion in *Eunique v. Powell*, 302 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2002) —similarly apply rational basis review. *Cf. Eunique*, 302 F.3d at 973 (opinion of Fernandez, J.) (applying rational basis); *Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb*, 82 F.3d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Given the lesser importance of this freedom to travel abroad, the Government need only advance a rational, or at most an important, reason for imposing the ban.").

i. The FAST Act satisfies both rational basis and intermediate scrutiny.

The SSN requirement is constitutional under either rational basis review or, as Mr. Root prefers, intermediate scrutiny. There is no serious question that the SSN requirement advances a legitimate and important government interest. Passports are a representation by the United States government, to other governments, of the bearer's identity. *See* 22 C.F.R. § 51.1 (defining "passport"); Peek Decl. ¶ 3. The government has an obvious interest, with implications for foreign relations, in ensuring accurate representations to

⁷ Petitioner cites *Maehr* for the proposition that "intermediate scrutiny" applies. Pet at 18. But the portion cited by Mr. Root was not joined by any other judge on the panel; rather, Judge Matheson's separate opinion applying rational basis review is controlling on this issue. 5 F.4th at 1104 (per curiam) (explaining that "Judge Matheson's opinion, joined by Judge Phillips, is the majority opinion on Mr. Maehr's substantive due process challenge"); *id.* at 1116 n.1 (opinion of Matheson, J.) (similar).

⁸ See, e.g., Van Hope-el v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 1:18-CV-0441, 2019 WL 295774, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2019); Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-654, 2016 WL 1446772, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016); Farley v. Santa Clara Cnty. Dep't of Child Support Servs., No. 11-cv-1994, 2011 WL 4802813, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011); Belazi v. Meisenheimer, No. 03-cv-1746, 2004 WL 1535727, at *6 (D. Or. July 8, 2004); United States v. Yip, 248 F. Supp. 2d 970, 973 (D. Haw. 2003).

foreign governments. Moreover, people use their passports as an official identification in a range of circumstances, such as opening bank accounts or obtaining a driver's license, where accuracy is essential. *See* Peek Decl. ¶ 3. The SSN's features—it "serves as a unique identifier that cannot be changed and is not generally disclosed by individuals to the public," *In re Crawford*, 194 F.3d at 958—make it especially useful in combatting identity fraud and in crosschecking other databases where biographical information (such as the spelling of names) might not otherwise match an application. *See* Peek Decl. ¶ 5-7. Because other common biographical information—like an applicant's name or birthday—may be widely available, the inclusion of the comparatively confidential SSN helps the State Department confirm that an applicant is who he says he is. *See id.* ¶ 6. Similarly, the inclusion of an SSN allows the Department to more effectively validate that the applicant is not ineligible for a passport because, for example, of an outstanding warrant or unpaid child support. *Id.* ¶¶ 4–9.

In addition, the requirement to include an SSN directly advances the government's interest collecting revenue by ensuring that applicants with large outstanding tax debts are denied a passport. *See generally* GAO Report; Peek Decl. ¶ 9. The Department relies on the Treasury Department's certification, which includes the individual's SSN. Peek Decl. ¶ 9. Because the SSN is the data point most directly linked to an individual's tax returns, its inclusion in the passport application allows the State Department to efficiently and accurately ensure that eligible applicants are not wrongly denied a passport and that ineligible applicants are not issued passports in error. *Id*.

These important government interests are more than adequate to survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, numerous courts have already held so. In *Walker v. Tillerson*, the district court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the SSN requirement unconstitutionally infringed his right to international travel. 2018 WL 1187599, at *8, aff'd, 735 F. App'x 69 (Mem.). In *Whitfield v. Secretary of State*, the Eleventh Circuit similarly rejected a constitutional challenge to the SSN requirement. 853 F. App'x at 329. And in *Maehr v. Department of State*, the Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to the FAST

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Act, with the majority applying rational basis review and the concurring judge upholding the law under intermediate scrutiny. Thus, under either rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny, this Court should reject Mr. Root's challenge to the eminently reasonable requirement that he include his unique, government-issued identifier in his passport application.

c. The statute is not unconstitutional "as applied" to Mr. Root.

Mr. Root's "as-applied" challenge fails because, as explained above, see supra Section III.B.2.b, the FAST Act's SSN requirement is a lawful restriction on his limited right to international travel. Mr. Root suggests that the government must show that the law is adequately justified with respect to him individually. But he misunderstands the nature of an as-applied challenge, which does not elevate the burden on the government to justify its laws, but instead simply eliminates the plaintiff's burden to show that the statute is unconstitutional in *every* application. "Facial and as-applied challenges differ in *the extent* to which the invalidity of a statute need be demonstrated." Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Legal Aid Servs. of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in original). In a facial challenge, a plaintiff "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. In an as-applied challenge, by contrast, a plaintiff "challenges only one of the rules in a statute, a subset of the statute's applications, or the application of the statute to a specific factual circumstance." *Issacson*, 716 F.3d at 1230 (quoting *Hove* v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 857 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, "[t]he precise characterization" of a challenge as either facial or as-applied "has little bearing on the resolution of the legal question." *Id.* Instead, the "substantive legal tests used in facial and as-applied challenges are 'invariant,'" and "the distinction matters primarily as to the remedy appropriate if a constitutional violation is found." *Id.* (quoting Hoye, 653 F.3d at 857).

The government therefore need not demonstrate that the FAST Act is sufficiently tailored to Mr. Root's particular circumstances, and the Supreme Court has rejected such

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an individualized assessment regime. The plaintiffs in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence challenged a blanket ban on camping on the National Mall. See 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The Supreme Court upheld the regulation and rejected the challengers' contention that Park Service needed to justify application of the ban to their specific planned protest: "[T]he validity of this regulation need not be judged solely by reference to the demonstration at hand." Id. at 296–97. And as a Ninth Circuit panel has further explained, "for an as-applied challenge, the government need not show that the litigant himself actually contributes to the problem that motivated the law he challenges." Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 2011), on reh'g en banc, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). Instead, it is enough to show—as already demonstrated above—that the law "generally 'furthers an important or substantial governmental interest." Id. (citation omitted); see also One World One Family Now v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1013 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting as-applied challenger's argument that the government needed to "offer any concrete evidence demonstrating that [the particular plaintiff's activities] actually" caused the harm the law generally sought to prevent).

Because the FAST Act's SSN requirement is sufficiently justified, it survives Mr. Root's as-applied challenge just as it survives his facial challenge.

d. The statute is not unconstitutional by reason of overbreadth.

Mr. Root's contention that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad fails at the outset. The overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the First Amendment context. *See Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 746 (rejecting overbreadth challenge under the Eighth Amendment and noting that "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment") (citation omitted); *see also United States v. Hansen*, 143 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2023) (describing limits of overbreadth doctrine). Nor is Mr. Root's underlying contention that the statute compels individuals to obtain an SSN correct. By its terms, the statute requires only that applicants include "the social security account number

⁹ Petitioner also notes the possibility of, but does not advance, a challenge to discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise constitutional law. *See* Pet. at 22.

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issued to that individual." 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(1) (emphasis added). The State Department does indeed issue passports to individuals who genuinely lack an SSN, such as U.S. citizens born and living abroad who have never had any reason to obtain one or those who do not obtain one for religious reasons—indeed, that is the reason the passport application has instructions for applicants without an SSN. See Passport Application at 1 ¶ 5 ("If you do not have a Social Security number, you must enter zeros in this field and submit a statement"). **CONCLUSION** IV. The Court should deny Mr. Root's petition and dismiss his complaint without leave to amend. Respectfully submitted, Dated: July 19, 2023 BRIAN M. BOYNTON Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General DIANE KELLEHER Assistant Director /s/Michael F. Knapp MICHAEL F. KNAPP Trial Attorney U.S. Department of Justice **Civil Division** Federal Programs Branch 1100 L St NW Washington, D.C. 20530 Tel.: (202) 514-2071 michael.f.knapp@usdoj.gov Counsel for U.S. Department of State

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendant, certifies that this brief contains 6,017 words, exclusive of the caption, tables, signature blocks, and this certification, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1. Dated: July 19, 2023 /s/Michael F. Knapp MICHAEL F. KNAPP