1 KEVIN V. RYAN (CSBN 118321) United States Attorney ORIGINAL 2 JOANN M. SWANSON (CSBN 88143) Chief, Civil Division ABRÁHAM A. SIMMONS (CSBN 146400) 3 Assistant United States Attorney 4 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36055 FILED San Francisco, California 94102-3495 5 Telephone: (415) 436-7264 FAX: (415) 436-6748 6 DEC 1 5: 2004 e-mail: abraham.simmons@usdoi.gov RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 Attorneys for Defendants 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 11 12 ROBERT-JOHN:FOTI: JOE NEUFELD: No. C 04-2567 PJH KEN AUGUSTINE, 13 **DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT** Plaintiffs, 14 OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 15 v. OFFICER McHUGH and other unknown The Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton 16 number of unnamed officers of the U.S. Marshals Service and the Federal Protective NO HEARING DATE; MOTION TO BE 17 Service; U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE; DECIDED ON THE PÁPERS FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, 18 19 Defendants. 20 21 22. 23 24 25 26 27 28

REPLY RE: MTN TO DISMISS FIRST AM. CMPLT.

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REPLY RE: MTN TO DISMISS FIRST AM. CMPLT. C 04-2567 PJH 1

## INTRODUCTION

Defendants have moved this Court for an order dismissing the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC") in its entirety for four reasons: first, Plaintiffs may not bring state-law tort claims against agencies or employees of the United States—instead, Plaintiffs are required to bring such claims only against the United States as the defendant and only after complying with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA"), two prerequisites with which Plaintiffs have not complied; second, Plaintiffs' constitutional claims for injunctive relief must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing the waiver of sovereign immunity upon which such claims rely; third, Plaintiffs' *Bivens* claims against the individual defendants (Defendant McHugh and the other unnamed officers) must be dismissed because such defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and fourth, Plaintiffs' obstruction of justice claim must be dismissed because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity so as to allow itself to be sued for such claims.

Plaintiffs do not oppose the Defendants' contention that no FTCA claim is cognizable here. Nor do Plaintiffs make any attempt to establish that their obstruction of justice claim has any validity. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims and their obstruction of justice charge should be granted as unopposed. Moreover, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' constitutional claims also should be granted because 1) as to the United States Marshals Service ("USMS") and the Federal Protective Service ("FPS"), Plaintiffs still have not identified a waiver of sovereign immunity upon which such claims may be pursued and 2) as to the individual defendants, Plaintiffs have no legal support for their contention that it is clearly established under federal law that federal officers may not check the identification of persons seeking to enter federal property even when such property contains areas restricted to authorized persons.

For all these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety and that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' cause and action with prejudice.

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## ARGUMENT

1. Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion to dismiss as regards the state law claims and the obstruction of justice claim.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims on the ground that such claims may be brought only against the United States as the defendant and only after Plaintiffs have complied with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the FTCA. Motion at 2-4. Defendants pointed out in their brief that there is no proof, for example, that Plaintiffs have complied with the jurisdictional prerequisite that Plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a claim under the FTCA. *Id*.

In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs emphatically agree that this case is not being brought under the FTCA. See Layman's Opposition to defendant's Motion to dismiss first Amended Complaint ("Plaintiffs' Brief") at 3-4. In addition, Plaintiff's do not provide any authority for bringing state law claims against the USMS or the FPS. Plaintiff's do not suggest nor provide evidence that the individual defendants were acting outside the scope of their federal employment with respect to any acts alleged in the complaint thereby attempting to establish that their state law claims against the individual defendants have a basis in law. Instead, Plaintiffs merely state that the state law claims are "actionable under the theory of pendent jurisdiction." Plaintiff's Brief at 4, ¶ 6. This statement is not an effective counter to Defendants' motion.

There is no basis for plaintiffs' state law claims and Plaintiffs effectively have not opposed the Defendants' motion to dismiss such claims. Accordingly, this Court should grant the

Similarly, Defendants moved to dismiss the claim entitled "obstruction of justice" on the ground that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists for such a claim. See Motion at 10-11. Plaintiffs do not challenge this legal contention in their opposition brief. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion should be granted in this regard as well. See Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1557-58 n. 4 (9th Cir.1987) (failure to address issue in opposition to motion to dismiss deemed fatal to claim).

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2. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that their exists a valid waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the USMS or the FPS for constitutional claims.

As set out in Defendants' moving papers (see Motion at 2-6) the burden is on plaintiff to point to an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted). If any valid waiver of immunity exists, the Plaintiffs are obligated to point it out so that the parameters of any lawsuit and waiver of immunity can be established.

In response, Plaintiff's identify only *Bivens*-type liability. See Plaintiff's Brief at 5-9. Such liability, however, only relates to damages (not injunctive relief) and applies only to individuals acting under color of federal law. Stated more directly, Bivens does not apply as against to the United States because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for suits for damages based on alleged constitutional violations by its employees. See Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986). Plaintiffs have failed to point to any other basis for liability. Accordingly, the constitutional claims against the USMS and the FPS must be dismissed in their entirety.

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that clearly established law precludes officers 3. from checking the identification of persons seeking to enter onto federal property.

The final claims remaining to be addressed are the constitutional claims against the individual defendants (i.e. Bivens claims). As pointed out in Defendants' brief, Bivens defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Here, Defendant have established that plaintiffs have no constitutional right to be free from identification checks when entering federal property. See 41 C.F.R. § 102.74-375(c) (agencies must "[e] nsure, when property or a portion thereof is closed to the public, ... [persons must] when requested, display Government or other identifying credentials to Federal police officers . . .). Moreover, even if such a constitutional right does exist, it was not "clearly established" at the times mentioned in the complaint. See e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (violation of rights not actionable if rights were not clearly

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established); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) ("[a]sking for and examining [airplane] ticket and driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves").

Plaintiffs have not cited a single case of persons seeking to avail themselves of federal property without presenting any form of identification. The cases that Plaintiffs' cite do not involving persons in secure areas and therefore are inapposite. Regulatory and decisional law (as well as common sense) all appear to suggest that the requirement to present identification is not a violation of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, this Court need not even address the issue. Instead, qualified immunity for federal officers should be granted whenever the alleged right is not clearly established. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Here, Plaintiffs are not able to cite a single case finding that persons have a constitutional right to enter secure federal property without identification and that enforcement of a requirement for identification is a violation of constitutional rights. Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the rights alleged to have been violated are clearly established, the federal officers are entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiffs' Bivens claims must fail. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

## CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs do not dispute that this Court lacks jurisdiction over their FTCA and obstruction of justice claims. Such claims should be dismissed. Further, Plaintiffs' claims against the USMS and FPS should likewise be dismissed because they have failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity against the agencies. Additionally, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' *Bivens* claims against Officer McHugh and the other unnamed officers because those individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In sum, Defendants respectfully request that the SAC and this entire action be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED: December 15, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

KEVIN V. RYAN United States Attorney

ABRAHAM A. SIMMONS
Assistant United States Attorney

REPLY RE: MTN TO DISMISS FIRST AM. CMPLT.

C 04-2567 PJH

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVI**

1	The undersigned hereby certifies that she is an employee of the Office of the United States
2	Attorney for the Northern District of California and is a person of such age and discretion to be
3	competent to serve papers. The undersigned further certifies that she is causing a copy of the following:
4	Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
5	Foti, et al. v. McHugh, et al. C 04-2567 PJH
6 7	to be served this date upon the party in this action by placing a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, and served as follows:
8	X FIRST CLASS MAIL by placing such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing U.S. mail in accordance with this office's practice.
9 L0	CERTIFIED MAIL (#) by placing such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing U.S. mail in accordance with this office's practice.
11	PERSONAL SERVICE (BY MESSENGER)
L2	FEDERAL EXPRESS
L3	FACSIMILE (FAX)
L4	HAND-DELIVERED
15	E-MAIL
L6	to the party addressed as follows:
L7-	Robert-John Foti Joseph Leonard Neufeld
18	Sovereign State Parties General Delivery Mission Rafael Station Woodacre, CA 94973 San Rafael, CA 94902
19	Woodacre, CA 94973 San Rafael, CA 94902  Kenneth Augustine
20	53 Mark Drive San Rafael, CA 94903
21	PH: 415.472.4952
22	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true
23	and correct. Executed on December 15, 2004 at San Francisco, California.
24	
25	$\Omega \Lambda$
26	LILY HO-WUONG
27	Tegal Accident

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